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THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF
WEAK PATENTS
WILLIAM HUBBARD*

Abstract: Does U.S. patent law increase the competitiveness of U.S. firms
in global markets? This Article argues that, contrary to the beliefs of many
U.S. lawmakers, U.S. patent law currently undermines the ability of U.S.
firms to compete in global markets because strong U.S. patent rights actually weaken an overlooked but critical determinant of U.S. competitiveness: rivalry among U.S. firms. Intense domestic rivalry drives firms to
improve relentlessly, spawns related and supporting domestic industries,
and encourages tlle domestic development of advanced factors of production-like specialized labor forces. U.S. patents restrict rivalry among
foreign firms less because U.S. patents have little extraterritorial effect.
Moreover, due to legal and economic differences between tlle United
States and other countries, foreign patents do not equilibrate competitive
conditions abroad. Consequently, for U.S. firms to benefit from the same
competitive environment as foreign firms, U.S. patents should be weakened. Such changes, however, also tllreaten to reduce U.S. competitiveness because U.S. patents promote tlle development of new inventions
that help U.S. firms compete in global markets. This Article thus exposes
a deep tension in U.S. economic policy. Unfortunately, lawmakers have
failed to recognize this tradeoff and, as a result, have adopted excessively
strong patent protections that undermine U.S. competitiveness. This Article addresses this problem by proposing balanced reforms that will selectively weaken U.S. patent protection to increase U.S. competitive advantage.
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INTRODUCTION

Current U.S. patent law is based on a fundamental misconception
regarding the effects of U.S. patents on U.S. competitiveness. The conventional view is that U.S. patents help firms in the United States to
compete against foreign rivals because U.S. patents provide U.S. inventors with exclusive rights that promote the discovery of socially beneficial inventions. Nevertheless, conventionalists recognize that exclusive
patent rights also inhibit competition regarding new inventions, and
that competition provides many benefits for society. As a result, U.S.
policymakers typically have tried to balance the incentive effect of U.S.
patents against the competitive costs. 1 When considering U.S. competitiveness in global markets, however, conventionalists have failed to understand the impact of territoriality on U.S. patent law and U.S. competitiveness. This Article strives to correct these errors.
Certainly, U.S. patent law is closely related to competition in global
markets. By providing inventors with exclusive rights to their discoveries, U.S. patents encourage innovation,2 and companies in the United
States frequently outcompete their international rivals by developing
better products or cheaper manufacturing processes. 3 Focusing on the
incentive effect of U.S. patents, U.S. lawmakers have long argued that
strong U.S. patents increase U.S. competitiveness. 4 Many commenta1 See, e.g., MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 6
(2008) (discussing the "need to strike a balance between providing sufficient incentive for
creation and the freedom to make use of existing ideas"); StuartJ.H. Graham et aI., High
Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24
BERKELEV TECH. LJ. 1255, 1258-59 (2009).
2 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress to "promote the progress of
science and the useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries"); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD
A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 294 (2003) ("The
standard rationale of patent law is that it is an efficient method of enabling the benefits of
research and development to be internalized, thus promoting innovation and technological progress."). Not all new discoveries, however, are patentable inventions. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 443 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)
(stating that laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas cannot be patented).
3 See MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 508 (1990) (recognizing that "productivity in American industry as a whole is still at or near the top compared to any nation"); see also id. at 70-76 (discussing the determinants of competitive
advantage).
4 See, e.g., Review of Findings of the President's Commission on Industrial Competitiveness:
Hearing Before the S. C01nm. on Fin., 99th Congo 11 (1985) (Senate Finance Committee Staff
Memorandum) (recommending that, to enhance U.S. competitiveness, "greater protection ... be given intellectual property"); 157 CONGo REc. S5411 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011)
(statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) ("Strengthening of our patent system will not only help
lead us out of these tough economic times, but it will help us maintain our competitive
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tors agree, asserting for instance that "[0] ne of the historical strengths
of the U.S. science, engineering and technology enterprise has been
the vigorous protection of [intellectual property] rights."5 Indeed,
some lawmakers apparently believe that U.S. patents predominately
issue to U.S. inventors and that improvements to the U.S. patent system
will therefore inure to the benefit of U.S. innovators, not foreign
firms.6 Bolstered by these arguments, patent rights have grown more
robust in the United States than in almost any other country. 7
edge both domestically and abmad."); 157 CONGo REc. S5433 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011)
(statement of Sen. Mark Kirk) (stating that legislation that "strengthen[s] our patent system ... [will] bolster om global competiveness [sic]"); 157 CONGo REc. E1206 (daily ed.
June 24, 2011) (statement of Rep. Chris Van Hollen) (indicating that "stronger patents ...
enhance our nation's economic competitiveness"); 153 CONGo lh:c. 23706 (2007) (arguing
that legislation resulting in weaker patent pmtection "is a severe threat to American innovation, American jobs and American competitiveness"); 148 CONGo lh:c. 18139 (2002)
(claiming that a pmposed bill "promotes America's economic competitiveness by
strengthening pmtections for intellectual pmperty"); 143 CONGo REc. 4359 (1997) ("[il\T]e
have had the strongest patent protection of any country of the world, and that is what has
ensured the American people for these last 200 years the ability to have a higher standard
of living than other countries of the world, because we were able to out-compete them.");
132 CONGo REt:. 18753 (1986) ("Our competitiveness is closely tied to innovations which
are promoted and pmtected by stmng laws on patents, copyrights and trademarks."); 131
CONGo REc. 21739 (1985) (stating that "strengthening intellectual pmperty rights was cited
as a major prescription for ensuring America's continued prosperity and economic competitiveness"); see also COUNCIL 01' ECON. ADVISERS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIIlENI
229 (2006) (discussing a bill pmposed in 2005 that "would strengthen intellectual pmperty
protection") .
5 COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, COMPETITIVENESS INDEX: WHERE AMERICA STANDS
77, 81 (2007); see also BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 1, at 46 (noting that industries have
successfully lobbied the U.S. government to strengthen intellectual pmperty rights during
time periods marked by "slow productivity growth");JamesJ. Anton et aI., Polic), Implications
of Weak Patent Rights, in 6 INNOVATION POLICY AND TIlE ECONOMY 1 (Adam B. Jaffe et al.
eds., 2006) (describing potential pmblems stemming fmm weak patent rights).
6 See Press Release, Senator Patrick Leahy, Comment of Senator Leahy on the Senate Motion to Pmceed to the America Invents Act (Aug. 2, 2011), http://www.leahy.senate.gov/
press/ comment-of-senator-leahY-Dn-the-senate-motion-to-proceed-to-the-america-invents-act
(arguing that reforms to U.S. patent laws would "give American inventors and innovators the
21st century patent system they need to compete"); see also Joseph Allen, Reexamination:
Boone or Bane?, Panel Remarks at the Seventh Annual Judicial Conference of the United
States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (Apr. 11, 1980), in 88 F.R.D. 369, 415 (1980)
('We feel very strongly that, by impmving the patent system, we're helping not only the Patent Bar and the Office, but also American inventors and innovative companies become more
successful in increasingly difficult competition.").
7 See BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 1, at 46 (noting that "business practices and financial securities" are patentable in the United States but not in "most of the rest of the
world"); LANDES & POSNER, supra note 2, at 2 (indicating that, during the 1970s, 1980s,
and even the 1990s, people believed that the United States was losing competitive gmund
to other nations, particularly Japan, and that emphasis on technological innovation was
necessary to prevent further decline); see also Anly Kapczynski, Harmonization and Its Discon-
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Nevertheless, the incentive effect of U.S. patent law often provides
U.S. innovators with little advantage over foreign rivals because inventors worldwide can obtain U.S. patents. 8 Indeed, because only U.S. patents can be asserted in the United States and because the U.S. economy
is the largest market in the world, foreign inventors are obtaining U.S.
patents in record numbers.9 In recent years, the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office ("U.S. Patent Office") has issued more U.S. patents
to foreign inventors than to U.S. inventors. 10
In contrast to the similar incentive effects of U.S. patents on U.S.
and foreign firms, the harms to competition stemming from U.S. patents fall disproportionately on firms in the United States. U.S. patents
have little effect on competition in foreign markets due to limits on the
extraterritorial effect of U.S. law. ll Some traditional patent policymakers have recognized that U.S. patents therefore can limit the technological tools available to firms within the United States while leaving
foreign rivals relatively unconstrained. As a result, U.S. lawmakers have
tents: A Case Study of the TRIPS Implementation in India's Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CALli<. L.
REv. 1571, 1588-1616 (2009) (describing differences between Indian patent law and U.S.
patent law and demonstrating that patent protections in India are weaker than protections
in the United States, particularly for pharmaceutical inventions).
8 See William Hubbard, Competitive Patent Law, 65 FLA. L. REv. 341, 354 (2013). This
equal access to U.S. patents is generally good for the U.S. economy because protectionism
can harm domestic prosperity by increasing prices and insulating domestic businesses
from competitive pressures. See id. at 361-63 (arguing against protectionist patent law).
9 See Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 889-90 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that foreign
patents cannot be asserted in the United States); U.S. Patent Statistics, Calendar Years 19632012, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (June 2013), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/
id%eip/taf/us_stat.pdf (illustrating the number of U.S. patents issued to foreign investors); World Top Consumer Markets Ranking, I RESERVOIR (Mar. 5, 2013), http://www.lreservoir.
com/awow-8788 (ranking the United States as the top consumer market).
10 See U.S. Patent Statistics, Calendar Years 1963-2012, supra note 9. Another reason for
the traditional misunderstanding of the effects of U.S. patent law on U.S. competitiveness
is that analyses of U.S. competitiveness often only consider issues related to finns headquartered in the United States. A broader analysis is appropriate for at least two reasons.
First, firms headquartered abroad, but operating in the United States, contribute significantly to U.S. gross domestic product (GDP). Second, even when headquartered in another country, a business unit in the United States can contribute to intense U.S. domestic
rivalry, which in turn can help to make firms headquartered in the United States more
competitive in global markets. Because of these concerns, this Article defines "U.S. firm"
and similar phrases broadly to include all business endeavors that contribute to U.S. GDP.
Similarly, "foreign firms" and similar phrases refer to business units that do not contribute
to U.S. GDP. See infra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
11 Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 527 (1972) (holding that
under U.S. patent law, making or using a patented product outside of the United States
does not constitute an infringement); NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282,
1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("Section 271 (a) [of Title 35] is only actionable against patent infringement that occurs within the United States.").
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sought to convince other countries to strengthen their patent laws to
match U.S. patent law. 12 Although many countries have refused, the
United States has nevertheless maintained high levels of patent protection, ostensibly because the benefits still outweigh the costS.13 U.S. patent policymakers have also ignored an additional cost inherent to U.S.
patent protection: U.S. patents weaken rivalry among competitors in the
United States-and domestic rivalry substantially impacts competitive
advantage. 14 For example, intense domestic rivalry drives firms to improve and to reduce internal inefficiencies. 15 Domestic rivalry also encourages the development of advanced factors of production, like
technological information, and helps to spawn important supporting
industries, like suppliers and manufacturers of related products. 16
Having failed to consider all of the costs of strong patent protection, U.S. lawmakers have embraced patent laws that actually undermine U.S. competitiveness. To maximize U.S. competitive advantage,
patent protection in the United States should be weakened. 17 Yet reducing the strength of U.S. patent rights could undermine incentives
to invent in the United States, and new inventions are often vital to U.S.
competitiveness. The competitive benefits of weakening U.S. patent
rights, then, must be weighed against the costs. This Article proposes
both general and specific reforms to U.S. patent law that will improve
the balancing of these countervailing effects on U.S. competitiveness. 18
12 S. REp. No. 104-394, at 6 (1996) ("FOl' mOl'e than a decade, a major objective of U.S.
international trade negotiations has been strengthening intellectual property protections
worldwide."); see also Kapczynski, supra note 7, at 1571 (describing the "trend of 'upward
harmonization,'" pursuant to which foreign law is strengthened to match the protections
provided by U.S. patent law).
13 E.g., Peter K Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement, 46 Hous. L. REv.
979,980 (2009) (describing international opposition to the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ('TRIPS")); Eric Pfanner, Europeans Reject Treat)' to
Combat Digital Pirac)" NY TIMES, July 5, 2012, at B5 (describing the European Parliament's
rejection of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement).
14 PORTER, supra note 3, at 117; see infra notes 155-167 and accompanying text (discussing how strong U.S. patent law may harm U.S. competitiveness).
15 Harry S. Gerla, Restoring Rivalry as a Central Concept in Antitrust Law, 75 NEil. L. REV.

209,224 (1996).
16 See PORTER, supra note 3, at 45-46, 73-77, 103-06; see also infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text (discussing specialized and advanced factors of production).
17 Weak patent rights should not be confused with patents produced by a weak patent
system. For example, a weak patent system may produce low-quality patents, like patents
that are likely to be invalid, but patents that provide owners with only limited rights are
weak patents.
18 Admittedly, efforts to increase U.S. competitive advantage may not maximize global
wealth. For example, spending a certain amount of U.S. federal tax revenue to improve
public education in the United States might improve the quality of the U.S. labor market,
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This Article proceeds in three primary parts. Part I examines the
importance of competitive advantage and the current state of U.S.
competitiveness in global markets, and further describes two important
determinants of competitive advantage: factor conditions and domestic
rivalry.19 Part II explores the effect of U.S. patent law on these determinants by analyzing the relationships among patents, competition,
and innovation. Using this framework, Part II evaluates the effectiveness of current approaches to using patent law to increase U.S. competitive advantage, concluding that they are ineffective. 20 Part III argues that to increase U.S. competitiveness, U.S. patent rights should be
weakened, and further analyzes the empirical challenges inherent to
any effort to restructure U.S. patent law to maximize U.S. competitiveness. 21 Part III proposes changes that will cost-effectively weaken U.S.
patent protection in ways that will account for these empirical complexities. 22

1.

ENHANCING

U.S.

COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE

A. The Importance of Competitive Advantage
The success in global markets of firms headquartered and operated in the United States is vital to American economic prosperity.23 If
such firms fail to compete against foreign rivals, U.S. citizens will be less
able to obtain jobs, and U.S. business owners may lose profits. Diminished U.S. competitiveness also leads to decreased foreign and domestic investment in businesses in the United States, which may further
limit domestic employment opportunities. Reduced employment and
business activity in the United States generate smaller tax revenues for
federal and local governments. The U.S. economy also suffers when a
multinational corporation decides to close or downsize a business unit
thereby helping some U.S. companies compete in global markets and marginally increasing global wealth. But spending that same sum of money may have a greater effect on education or public health in another country, thereby increasing global wealth more substantially. The scope of this Article, however, does not extend to the impact of U.S. competitive
advantage on global wealth.
19 See infra notes 23-90 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 91-194 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 195-321 and accompanying text.
22 See infra 238-321 and accompanying text.
23 Cf MICHAEL A. UrTON, INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION ('OLICV: MAINTAINING OPEN
MARKETS IN TIlE GLOBAL ECONOMY, at vi (2006) ("While more and more countries adopt
policies to regulate competition within their borders, at the same time many cases take on
an international dimension.").
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located in the United States. And when a corporation expands a foreign business unit rather than a U.S. facility, the U.S. economy may lose
a growth opportunity.
As a result, this Article defines "U.S. company" and similar terms
broadly to include any business unit that contributes to U.S. gross domestic product (GDP). For example, a U.S. factory is considered a U.S.
firm in this Article even if it is owned by a firm with facilities in other
countries, and those foreign business units are "foreign firms" for the
purposes of this Article. When U.S. companies-under this inclusive
definition of that term-succeed in global markets, the U.S. economy
prospers. Conversely, when economic endeavors located in the United
States fail to compete against international rivals, including foreign
business units within the same multinational corporation, the U.S.
economy suffers.
The competitiveness of U.S. companies in high-productivity industries is particularly important. Productivity describes the amount of
economic value produced by a given quantity of labor, and labor that
generates substantial value is commensurately well-compensated. 24
Productivity is the primary determinant of national per capita income
and, consequently, of national standard of living. 25 "If the industries
that are losing position to foreign rivals are the relatively more productive ones in the economy, a nation's ability to sustain productivity
growth is threatened."26 Thus, maintaining and improving standards of
living in the United States depends on the capacity of U.S. firms to
compete successfully against foreign rivals in high-productivity endeavors.27
Unfortunately, by some measures, the competitiveness of U.S.
companies in global markets has been waning. 28 For example, the
PORTER, supra note 3, at 6.
Id.
26 Id. at 8. Similarly, standards of living are threatened "when activities involving high
levels of pl'Oductivity (such as sophisticated manufacturing) are transferred abl'Oad
thl'Ough foreign investment." Id.
27 See Gerla, supra note 15, at 254 ('Trillions of dollars, millions of jobs, and the standard
oflhing of the nation ride on the development of [globally competitive] industries.").
28 See, e.g., PORTER, supra note 3, at 12 ("America, with skilled labor, preeminent scientists, and ample capital, has seen el'Oding export market shares in industries where one
would least expect it, such as machine tools, semiconductors, and sophisticated electronic
pl'Oducts."). On the other hand, some economic studies pl'Ovide a more optimistic view of
U.S. competitiveness. See, e.g., Frederick E. Allen, The U.S. Still Leads the World in Competitiveness, FORBES (May 30, 2012, 6:39 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/frederickallen/
2012/05/30/the-u-s-still-leads-the-world-in-competitiveness/ (describing a recent analysis of
competitiveness that concludes that the United States enjoys superlative competitiveness).
24

25
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World Economic Forum (''WEF'') measures competitiveness by analyzing a number of related characteristics, including the quality of education and training; the efficiency of labor and capital markets; infrastructure; technological readiness; business sophistication; and innovation. 29
In 2007 and 2008, the United States topped the WEF competitiveness
rankings. 30 Thereafter, however, the United States began to drop in the
rankings, slipping to second in 2009, fourth in 2010, fifth in 2011, and
seventh in 2012.31 A recent study conducted by Harvard Business
School similarly indicates that the competitiveness of U.S. firms has decreased. 32 When more than 50,000 alumni of the school were surveyed
about "the extent to which firms operating in the U.S. are able to compete successfully in the global economy while supporting high and rising living standards for Americans," more than 71 % of the respondents
believed that U.S. competitiveness would "deteriorate. "33
Recent measures of some of the factors that affect competitiveness
raise further questions about the future of U.S. competitiveness. 34 For
example, the availability of a highly trained and educated labor force
affects the competitiveness of domestic firms. Unfortunately, the U.S.
educational system notoriously underachieves, particularly in science,
technology, engineering, and math. 35 Most of the world's high school
students outperform U.S. high school students on international math
and science tests,36 and the United States ranks seventeenth in the

29 WORLD ECON. FORUM. THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2008-2009. at 4-6
(2009).
30 Id. at 10.
31 WORLD ECON. FORUM. THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2012-2013. at 13
(2012); WORLD ECON. FORUM, TIlE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REpORT 2010-2011, at 15
(2010); Kai Buche1~ US Competitiveness Ranking Continues to Fal~' Emerging Markets Are Closing the
Gap. WORLD ECON. E. (Sept. 7. 2011). http://www.weforum.org/news/us-competitivenessranking-continues-fall-emerging-markets-a1'e-closing-gap.
32 MICHAEL E. PORTER & JAN W. RIVKIN. PROSPERITV AT RISK: FINDINGS 01' HARVARD
BUSINESS SCHOOL'S SURVEV ON U.S. COMPETITIVENESS 3 (2012).
33 Id. at 3-4.
34 See infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text (illustrating this proposition); infra
notes 42-90 and accompanying text (discussing the determinants of competitive advantage).
35 See NORMAN R. AUGUSTINE. Is AMERICA FALLING 01'1-' THE FLAT EARTH? 30-34
(2007).
36 COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, INNOVATE AMERICA: NATIONAL INNOVATION INITIATIVE
SUMMIT AND REPORT 49 (2005); see also NAI'L MATH & SCI. INITIATIVE. The Results Are in: The
National Math and Science Initiative's Comprehensive AP Program Works 1-2 (2013). http:! /
www.nms.0l'g/POl,tals/0/lmages/pages/1'esearchAndResults/NMSI%20Infog1'aphic%20
HandouCdouble-sided_v2.pdf (providing statistics regarding the weaker performance of U.S.
schools vis-a-vis foreign educational systems).
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world in high school graduation rate. 37 Performance in higher education is similar: the United States ranks fourteenth in the world in per
capita college graduation rates, and thirteenth in the world in doctoral
graduation rates. 38 Un surprisingly, this educational mediocrity leads to
a lack of researchers in the United States;39 and many U.S. companies
now send their research and development efforts overseas. 40 According
to the National Science Foundation, almost a quarter of all research
and development workers employed by U.S. companies work outside of
the United States. 41

B. Determinants of Competitive Advantage
Competitive advantage depends on the interaction of numerous
economic considerations. In his seminal work The Competitive Advantage
of Nations, celebrated economist Michael Porter analyzes the factors
that give businesses in some countries competitive advantages over
their international rivals. Porter argues that "firms gain and sustain
competitive advantage in international competition through [continuous] improvement, innovation, and upgrading. "42 Porter identifies four
determinants that contribute to the capacity of domestic firms to improve, innovate, and upgrade: (1) factor conditions; (2) related and
supporting industries; (3) demand conditions; and (4) firm strategy,
structure, and rivalry.43 Each determinant affects the others, and they
AUGUSTINE. supra note 35, at 19.
Id. at 19; New Doctorate Graduates, OECD ILIBRARY, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.
org/ sites/ sti_scoreboard-2011-en/02/01/ index.html?contentType=&itemld=/ content/
book/ sti_scoreboard-20l1-en&containerItemld=/ content/book/ sti_scoreboard-2011-en&
accessItemIds=&mimeType=text/html (last visited Oct. 3, 2013). Similarly, the United
States ranks twenty-sixth in the world in the percentage of doctoral degrees that are
awarded in science and engineering. New Doctorate Graduates, supra.
39 See COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 36, at 49.
40 Ron Hira, U.S. Workers in a GlobalJobMarket, ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH. ONLINE, http://
www.issues.org/25.3/hira.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2013). For example, General Electric, a
company founded by American Thomas Edison, now has more research and development
employees located outside of the United States than within it. Id.
41 Francisco Moris & Nirmala Kannankutty, New Employment Statistics from the 2008 Business R&D and Innovation Survey, INFOBRIEF,july 2010, at 1,1.
42 PORTER, supra note 3, at 70; see AUGUSTINE ET AI.., NAT'1. ACAIl. 01' SCIS., NAT'1.
ACAIl. OF ENG'G, & INST. OF MEIl. OF THE NAT'1. ACAIlS., RISING ABOVE THE GATHERING
STORM, REVISITED 43-44 (2010) (arguing that innovation spurs a competitive economy).
Porter notes that this process of improving goods and services must be on-going because
the advantages of today's products are superseded by future improvements. PORTER, supra
note 3, at 51.
43 PORTER, supra note 3, at 71. Factor conditions are "[t]he nation's position in factors
of production, such as skilled labor or infrastructure, necessary to compete in a given in37
38
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are all affected by both chance and government, including law. 44 A full
discussion of Porter's analysis of the determinants of competitive advantage is beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, this Article focuses
on two determinants of competitive advantage: factor conditions and
domestic rivalry. 45
1. Factor Conditions
Factor conditions depend upon the cost and availability of "factors
of production," which are "the inputs necessary to compete in any industry, such as labor, arable land, natural resources, capital, and infrastructure."46 For example, the large quantities of arable land in the
United States help the nation lead the world in many agricultural markets. 47 Although countries may face different factor endowments,
"globalization has made local availability of some factors less essential. "48 Raw materials, for instance, can often be purchased on global
markets even if they are otherwise unavailable locally. 49
Some types of factors of production contribute more to competitive advantage than others. In many industries, cheap access to basic
factors, like natural resources and unskilled labor, provide little sustainable competitive advantages because businesses in other countries can
replicate these factor conditions. 50 For example, although Chinese
businesses have benefitted from cheap unskilled labor, other developing countries may soon have cheaper labor pools, particularly as Chi-

dustry." Id. Demand conditions are "[tJhe nature of home demand for the industry's
product or service." Id. Related and supporting industries are "[tJhe presence or absence
in the nation of supplier industries and related industries that are internationally competitive." Id. (footnote omitted). Finally, firm strategy, structure, and rivalry are "[tJhe conditions in the nation governing how companies are created, organized, and managed, and
the nature of domestic rivalry." Id.
44 Id. at 127.
45 Although the remaining determinants are important to competitive advantage, patent law has little direct effect on them.
46 PORTER, supra note 3, at 73-74.
47 See id. at 294 (noting that "[tJhe United States has been well endowed with natural
factors of production, among them an exceptionally large supply of arable land").
48 Id. at 76.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 77. In addition, "[bJasic factors are passively inherited, or their creation requires relatively modest or unsophisticated private and social investment." Id. They are
important in "extractive or agriculturally based industries (such as timber and soybeans)
and in those where technological and skill requirements are modest and technology is
widely available." Id.
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nese economic success raises the cost of labor in China. 51 In contrast,
specialized and advanced factors of production, like high-speed internet, modern infrastructure, and highly educated labor, "are now the
most significant [factors] for competitive advantage," particularly in
high-productivity economic endeavors. 52 Creating these specialized and
advanced factors of production typically requires significant and sustained investment and effort. 53
One importan t type of advanced, specialized factor of production is
technological information. According to Porter, "Technological change
can create new possibilities for the design of a product, the way it is
marketed, produced, or delivered, and the ancillary services provided. It
is the most common precursor of strategic innovation."54 When competitors can cheaply obtain the same technological information, however, it provides little durable competitive advantage. As discussed in
more detail below, technological advantages that are patented provide
more lasting competitive advantages because, although patents are public documents that disclose the details of a patented invention, the patent holder enjoys exclusive rights to commercialize the invention. 55

51 Id. (noting that "[a]n unskilled worker is increasingly vulnerable to pressures on
wages"). Per capita gross domestic product in China has quadrupled since 1990. Richard
A. Easterlin, When Growth Outpaces Happiness, NY TIMES, Sept. 27, 2012, at A3S, available at
h up: / /www.nytimes.com/20 12/ 09 /28/ opinion/ in-china-growth-ou tpaces-happiness.htmL
52 PORTER, supra note 3, at 77. Adyanced factors help to produce "higher-order" competitive advantages. Id. Such highel~order advantages include, for example, differentiated
products and proprietary production technology. Id. Adyanced factOl's are also "scarcer
because their development demands large and often sustained investments in both human
and physical capitaL" Id.
53 Id. at 77-78.
54 Id. at 45-46.
55 See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
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2. Domestic Rivalry
Domestic rivalry is also critical to competItIve advantage. 56 Competitors force one another to innovate, reduce costs, and improve quality and service. 57 Rivals invest in improving their capacity to compete
"as much from fear of falling behind as the inducement of getting
ahead. "58 New business formation is vital to fostering rivalry because
new businesses offer new services and target new markets that older
companies do not acknowledge or are too un adaptable to react to
themselves. 59 Indeed, because of the need to challenge the advantages
of existing companies, new entrants have clear incentives to develop
innovations that render existing products or services obsolete. 60
Rivalry also helps to reduce the inefficiences that exist within
firms, such as when firms "do not minimiz[e] their costS."61 Numerous
56 PORTER, supra note 3, at 117-24 (describing the strong productive effects of domestic rivalry). Although Porter groups domestic rivalry with finn strategy and structure, this
Article focuses on domestic rivalry. Nevertheless, firm strategy and structure also significantly affect competitive advantage. For instance, "[n]ations will tend to succeed in industries where the management practices and modes of organization favored by the national
environment are well suited to the industries' sources of competitive advantage." PORTER,
supra note 3, at 108. Similarly, nations will thrive in industries whose firms pursue goals
that cultivate sources of competitive advantage. For example, many large corporations in
the United States are publicly traded and thus frequently focus on maximizing quarterly
and annual share price. In contrast to the comparatively short-term focus of large, publicly
traded U.S. companies, many large German corporations concentrate on longer-term
goals because significant numbers of shares are held by institutions like banks. Id. at 11011. Although the role of long-term investors in Germany may be changing, these German
corporations currently "do well in mature industries requiring ongoing investment in research and new facilities." Id. at 111, 376-77.
57 Id. at 118; accord Jonathan B. Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters
Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST LJ 575, 579-81 (2007). AsJudge Learned Hand observed more
than sixty years ago, "Many people believe that possession of unchallenged economic power deadens initiative, discourages thrift and depresses energy; that immunity from competition is a narcotic, and rivalry is a stimulant, to industrial progress; that the spur of constant stress is necessary to counteract an inevitable disposition to let well enough alone."
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945).
58 PORTER, supra note 3, at 118.
59 Id. at 122.
60 See CLAVTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR'S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL 45-48 (1997); Michael A. Carrier, Two Puzzles Resolved: Of
the Schumpeter-Arrow StalRmate and Pharmaceutical Innovation Markets, 93 IOWA L. REV. 393,
406-08 (2008).
61 Gerla, supra note 15, at 224; see ROGER S. FRANTZ, X-EFFICIENCY: THEORY, EVIDENCE
AND ApPLICATIONS 35 (2d ed. 1997) ("[Intrafirm inefficiency] was unknown because the
orthodoxy of the day (and largely of today) assumes that firms are producing on both their
production and cost function. "). Although the concept of intrafinn inefficiency "mns counter to a basic operating assumption of modern neoclassical economics-firms always seek to
maximize their profits by maximizing output for a given input and by minimizing costs for a
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factors contribute to intrafirm inefficiencies, including lack of motivation, human inertia, and flaws in decision making. 62 Rivalry helps to
reduce intrafirm inefficiencies by pressuring employees of firms to behave more rationally.63 Indeed, several empirical studies have confirmed that rivalry reduces in trafirm inefficiencies. 64 By one estimate,
the cost of this type of inefficiency in the United States is more than $1
trillion.65 Thus, rivalry helps encourage firms to eliminate enormously
wasteful inefficiencies. 66 Moreover, "[t]o the extent that rivalry curbs
[intrafirm] inefficiencies in firms it can serve to facilitate the creation
and commercial exploitation of innovations. "67
Although rivalry between foreign and domestic competitors is important to competitive advantage, domestic rivalry fosters competitive
advantage more for at least three reasons. 68 First, firms are more responsive to competition from domestic rivals. In general, firms face
lower transaction costs in gathering detailed information about domestic rivals than about foreign competitors. 69 For example, language and
given rate" -severe intrafirm inefficiencies have been identified in numerous empirical
studies. Gerla, supra note 15, at 224; see FRANTZ, supra, at 2. Significantly, intrafinn inefficiency is different from the deadweight loss of allocative inefficiency. FRANTZ, supra, at 15, 35.
Allocative inefficiency occurs when the actions of profit-maximizing firms reduce overall
social welfare. Id. at 15. For example, allocative inefficiency arises when a monopolist maximizes profits by resu"icting output and raising prices. Even with a higher price, some consumers will still purchase the monopolist's products, but these consumers will transfer a
greater amount of wealth to the monopolist than would occur under perfect competition. Id.
Unfortunately, the monopolist's profit-maximizing su"ategy reduces social wealth because
some consumers will be unable to pay the monopolist's supracompetitive prices. Id. These
lost sales do not reflect a wealth U"ansfer from consumers to the monopolist; instead, these
sales do not occur at all. Under perfect competition, those same sales generate gains from
trade for both consumers and producers. Id. The loss of these sales represents a deadweight
loss to social wealth. Id. Although the monopolist expeliences losses from the deadweight
loss, it is still willing to resttict production and thereby produce allocative inefficiencyprovided those losses do not exceed its gain from the consumer wealth tt"ansfer. See FRANTZ,
supra, at 15.
62 FRANTZ, supra note 61, at 35.
63 Id. at 58; see Gerla, supra note 15, at 223.
64 FRANTZ, supra note 61, at 224; Gerla, supra note 15, at 227.
65 See Gerla, supra note 15, at 227.
66 Id. at 254.
67 Id. at 236 (footnote omitted).
68 See id. at 247 (noting that "all rivalry is not fungible" and that domestic rivalry is
more important than foreign rivalry in cultivating competitive advantage). Plainly, from
the perspective of competitive advantage, rivalry between U.S. firms and foreign competitors provides similar benefits to both firms and therefore may provide neither firm with
significant relative advantage over the other.
69 PORTER, supra note 3, at 120 ("Ideas diffuse faster within the nation than across nations, because it is difficult for firms from other countries to tap into such a process."); see
Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257,268-70 (2007)
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cultural barriers may limit access to information about foreign competitors. In addition, firms hire fewer employees from foreign competitors than from domestic rivals, and employee mobility is an important
conduit for the diffusion of certain forms of commercial information. 70
Firms also may respond differently to information about domestic
rivals than to information about foreign competitors. Domestic rivalries
often extend past economic issues and can become "emotional and
even personal" because domestic firms fight for "bragging rights" as
well as market share. 71 In contrast, foreign rivals produce less intense
competition, in part because the success of foreign rivals may be attributed to other determinants of competitive advantage, such as different
factor conditions. In other words, "[w] ith domestic rivals, there are no
excuses. "72
Second, domestic rivalry contributes more to competitive advantage than international rivalry because domestic rivals face similar factor conditions. As a result, domestic rivalry prevents firms from depending too heavily on less durable sources of competitive advantage,
like cheap labor, because other domestic firms enjoy similar access to
the same resources. 73 Firms are forced to pursue more advanced factors of production, which are harder to develop and thus are more sustainable sources of competitive advantage. 74 For example, domestic
rivals may create demand for highly trained employees, thereby precipitating specialized training programs. 75
Third, domestic rivalry contributes more to competitive advantage
than international rivalry because domestic rivalry catalyzes another
determinant of competitive advantage: related and supporting industries. Importantly, domestic rivalry-not foreign rivalry-is the most im-

(asserting that innovation continually begets innovation, especially when geographically
concentrated); Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 576-77
(1999) (describing geographical clusters of firms that form partly as a result of proximity
of industry expertise). Concededly, technological innovations like the Internet and language translation software likely have reduced some of these transaction costs to some
extent.
70 See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 69, at 268.
71 PORTER, supra note 3, at 119.
721d.
73Id.
74 1d.; see supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text (discussing advanced and specialized factors of production).
75 PORTER, supra note 3, at 134. For example, "[wlith a group of rivals, there are a
number of potential employers for graduates and several supporters and users of specialized facilities, programs, and knowledge." 1d.
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portant factor in the growth of related and supporting industries. 76
Domestic rivals produce competitive markets for suppliers and commercial opportunities for related industries. 77 Indeed, related or supplier companies are often founded by employees who leave domestic
firms.78 Intense domestic rivalry also helps to generate advanced and
specialized factors of production, which may benefit suppliers and related industries. 79
Related and supporting industries facilitate competitive advantage
by producing commercial synergies. Suppliers can "help firms perceive
new methods and opportunities to apply new technology. "80 Related
industries "share activities in the value chain" and therefore provide
opportunities for valuable information exchange. 81 For example, successful domestic computer manufacturers may improve the competitiveness of software companies. Moreover, firms generally face lower
transaction costs in coordinating with domestic suppliers and related
industries than with foreign industries. 82 One reason for this is that
"[p] roximity of managerial and technical personnel, along with cultural similarity, tends to facilitate free and open information flow. "83
Together, the businesses, suppliers, and related industries in one location form an economic "cluster. "84 As with the sharing of similar factor
conditions, "[ t] he existence of a cluster of several industries that draws
on common inputs, skills, and infrastructure ... stimulates government
bodies, educational institutions, firms, and individuals to invest in relevan t factor creation or factor-creating mechanisms. "85 Furthermore,

Id. at 138.
Id. at 140. By way of illustration, "the concentration of rivals in movie and television
production in Hollywood has led to the growth of a thriving and highly specialized group
of supplier industries, ranging from special effects finns, to costume designers, to firms
providing production insurance." Id. at 139.
78 Id. at 140.
79 See supra notes 46-55 and accompanying text.
80 PORTER, supra note 3, at 103. With domestic suppliers and industries, "[f]irms gain
quick access to information, to new ideas and insights, and to supplier innovations." Id.
81 Id. at 105.
82 Id. Nations are often internationally competitive in related industries. Id.
83 Id. at 103; accord id. at 106 ("Proximity and cultural similarity make such interchange
easier than is the case with foreign finns."); see U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, TIlE COMPETInVENESS AND INNOVATIVE CAPACITY Of< THE UNITED STATES 6-3 (2012) (suggesting that
the overseas relocation of supporting manufacturing facilities could impair U.S. research
and development).
84 PORTER, supra note 3, at 135.
85Id.
76
77
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reduced transaction costs within an economic cluster facilitate the coordination of research and deyelopmen t. 86
In sum, "[a] group of capable domestic riyals ... creates a fertile
environment for creating and sustaining competitive advantage that is
difficult to replicate through competition with foreign rivals. "87 It is
important to note that Porter supported his analysis with both economic arguments and empirical research. Porter analyzed the competitive advantages of firms from ten countries oyer a period of four years
with the help of a team of more than thirty researchers, and among his
team's strongest findings was the connection between domestic rivalry
and competitive adyantage. 88 Porter concluded, "It is rare that a company can meet tough foreign rivals when it has faced no significant
competition at home. "89 This empirical finding-that domestic rivalry
significantly contributes to competitive advantage and productiyityhas been independently verified numerous times. 90

II. U.S.

PATENT LAW AND COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE

Government and law can affect the determinants of competitive
advantage. 91 For example, education and immigration law can affect
the availability of highly skilled labor.92 Likewise, enyironmentallaw can
affect the cost of basic factors of production, like lumber and crude

86 Id. at 103. Because domestic economic clusters are vital to competitive advantage.
outsourcing certain aspects of an industry to foreign businesses can undermine long-term
competitive advantage in the United States. See U.S. DEP'T m COMMERCE. supra note 83. at
6-3.
87 PORTER, supra note 3, at 121. Significantly, finns that are headquartered overseas but
operate in the United States can contribute to intense domestic rivalry in the United
States. which in turn can help to make firms headquartered in the United States more
competitive in global markets. The contribution to U.S. domestic rivalry of finns that are
headquartered in foreign countries demonstrates the importance of defining "U.S. firm"
and similar phrases broadly to include all business units that contribute to U.S. GDP. See
supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text (defining U.S. firms fO!' the purposes of this
Article).
88 PORTER. supra note 3. at 117.
89 Id. at 119.
90 Baker. supra note 57. at 586-87 & n.29 (collecting sources which illustrate that industries with greater intranational competition have higher productivity); see also Gerla.
supra note 15, at 247 (endO!'sing PO!'ter's analysis).
91 PORTER, supra note 3, at 127. Porter notes that "[i] t is tempting to make government
the fifth determinant," but this is not accurate because government only indirectly affects
competition via its impacts on the four determinants. Id. at 126-27; see supra note 43 and
accompanying text (listing the four determinants).
92 PORTER, supra note 3, at 627-30.
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oil.93 In addition, tax law can affect demand conditions for different
products and services. For instance, tax credits can increase domestic
demand for new technologies, such as high-efficiency solar panels. 94
Furthermore, antitrust law can foster robust rivalry and shape company
strategy.95 Like these other areas of law, patent law can affect competitive advantage. 96 In particular, U.S. patent law affects factor conditions
and domestic rivalry in the United States.
A. US. Patent Law and FactoT Conditions

One way that U.S. patent law affects competitive advantage is by
facilitating the creation of an important factor of production: information. 97 Significantly, patent law encourages the discovery of new information by granting inventors exclusive but temporary rights to their
discoveries. 98 Patents also encourage the discovery of new information
by publicizing information regarding new inventions. To obtain exclusive patent rights, inventors must disclose sufficient information in
their patents to enable a person of ordinary skill to use the protected
invention. 99 Patent-related disclosures may help subsequent researchers
discover new inven tions.lOO

Cf id. at 640-44 (discussing the impact of policies on factor and currency markets).
See 26 U.S.c. § 25D(a) (1), (d) (2) (2006) (describing tax credits for "property which
uses solar energy to generate electricity").
95 PORTER, supra note 3, at 662-63.
96 See BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 1, at 43. In fact, at least one early version of modern patent law was designed to boost domestic factors of production by "attracting particularly skillful artisans and merchants from other states." See id.
97 See supra notes 54-55, 76-82 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of
information-sharing to competitive advantage).
98 See 35 U.S.c. § 154(a) (1)-(2) (2006 & Supp. VI 2012). Although patents encourage
innovation, they also sene other purposes. Graham et aI., supra note 1, at 1287, 1299 (reporting numerous reasons to obtain patent rights). For example, patents signal information in a variety of contexts. William Hubbard, Inventing Norms, 44 CONN. L. REV. 369, 39397 (2011) (arguing that patents serve as signals that support social norms); Clarisa Long,
Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 647 (2002) (arguing that a patent signals to sources
of capital that the patent owner engages in significant research and development). Expanding defenses to patent infringement rather than raising the costs of obtaining patents
may help to support these other benefits of patenting because the vast majority of patents
are never asserted in litigation or licensing negotiations. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1495, 1507, 1514 (2001) (arguing that some of
the issues of patent law are most efficiently addressed by courts rather than by the Patent
Office because only 5% of patents are asserted through litigation or licensing).
9935 U.S.c. § 112(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
100 Jason Rantanen, PeripheralDisclosllre, 74 U. I'll,/,. L. REV. 1,9-12 (2012). But see id. at
13-15 (discussing criticisms of the disclosure function of patents). The value of this disclo93
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The factor-creation effect of U.S. patent law, however, may provide
little competitive advantage to U.S. firms because U.S. patent law also
improves factor conditions for foreign firms. To start, U.S. patents are
public documents available to anyone with an Internet connection. IOI
Moreover, the United States has joined international treaties that guarantee foreign inventors access to U.S. patent rights. For example, under
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights ("TRIPS"), the United States has agreed to "accord to the nationals of other [signatories] treatment no less favorable than that it
accords its own nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual
property."I02 U.S. patent law thus serves as a factor-creation mechanism
for both foreign and U.S. firms.
Despite this formal neutrality, the application of U.S. patent law
could favor U.S. firms for two reasons. First, firms from some countries,
particularly developing countries, might face greater costs than U.S.
inventors in discovering new inventions. 103 For instance, highly educated workers are vital to innovation but may be rare in some coun-

sure is limited, however, to the extent that patents prevent competitors from improving
upon an initial invention.
101 See Search for Patents, u.s. PAT. & TRADEMARK (>1<1-'., http://www.uspto.gov/patents/
process/search/ (last modified Aug. 8, 2013, 11:08 AM) (providing a search engine for
issued patents). In fact, most patent applications are published eighteen months after they
are submitted to the U.S. Patent Office. See 35 U.S.c. § 122(b) (1) (2006).
102 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 3, Apr. 15,
1994, MalTakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex lC, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS] (citation omitted). TRIPS construes "protection" broadly
as "includ[ing] matters affecting the availability, acquisition, scope, maintenance and enfOl'cement of intellectual property lights." Id. art. 3 n.3. Fmthermore, under Article 27 of
TRIPS, patent rights must be available "without discrimination as to the place of invention
... and whether products are imported 01' locally produced." Id. art. 27; see also Paris Com'ention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 2, Mar. 20, 1883, as last revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 ("Nationals of any country [that has
signed the treaty] shall, as regards the protection of industrial property, enjoy in all of the
other countries [that have signed the treaty] the advantages that their respective laws now
grant, or may hereafter grant, to nationals .... ").
103 See Jerome H. Reichman, IntellRctual Property in the Twenty-First Century: Will the Developing Countries Lead aT Follow?, 46 Hous. L. REv. 1115, 1116-17 (2009) (recognizing that
intellectual property rights constitute just one of many elements of economic growth and
that factor conditions also playa role); Yu, supra note 13, at 988 (indicating that, at one
point, mOl'e than 99% of the world's stock of patents were owned by nationals of industrialized nations). As a result, countries where firms produce few new inventions have been
reluctant to enact robust intellectual property laws. See Reichman, supra, at 1116-17 ("[I] n
many countries, especially those at an early stage of development, a sound agricultural
policy 01' sound pro-competitive industrial policy with a supportive political and legal infrastructure are more likely to stimulate economic growth than intellectual property laws.").
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tries. I04 As a result, it may be difficult for firms from those countries to
discover patentable inventions, and the factor-creation incentives from
U.S. patent law would therefore favor U.S. firms.I05 By analogy, a saw is
a better factor-creation mechanism in a heavily forested country than in
a country covered in grassy plains. Second, U.S. patent law may favor
U.S. inventors if transaction costs, including language and cultural barriers, prevent foreign inventors from successfully obtaining or enforcing U.S. patents on their inventions. lo6
But even if the application of U.S. patent law sometimes favors U.S.
firms regarding the creation of advanced factors of production, that advantage has waned for at least two reasons. First, by many measures, the
innovative capacities of firms in many countries have grown in recent
years. I07 For example, the Information Technology and Innovation
Foundation recently released a study comparing the innovative capacities of forty differ en t coun tries. IDS The study considered sixteen factors
to measure innovative capacity in each country, including the number
of science and technology researchers, the amount of capital invested in
research, the number of scholarly publications, the availability of technological infrastructure like high-speed Internet, tax rates, gross domestic product per working-age adult, and worker productivity. 109 The study
concluded that the United States ranked fourth, behind Singapore, Finland, and Sweden. llo Most alarming, however, was the study's examination of investment in innovation in the past twelve years. In that multifactor comparison, the United States ranked thirty-ninth. lll
Second, numerous factors have reduced the transaction costs facing foreign firms seeking to acquire U.S. patents. For instance, millions
of citizens of other countries have learned to speak English. ll2 FurPORTER. supra note 3. at 79.
See id. at 76-80.
106 Hubbard, supra note 8, at 364-65. One example of how language baniers are prevalent may be illustrated by the recent patent infringement suit between Apple. Inc. and
Samsung Electronics, Co., in which many of Samsung's witnesses needed interpreters to
help with their testimony. Dan Levine & Poornima Gupta, Analysis: How Apple Overwhelmed
Sa17lsung's Patent Case Tactics, Ih:UTERS, Aug. 27, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.
com/article/2012/08/27 /us-apple-samsung-legal-idUSBRE87Q02K20120827.
107 See Hubbard, supra note 8, at 352 (collecting studies that suggest the United States
is not out-innovating the rest of the world).
108 ROIIERT n. ATKINSON & SCOTT M. ANDES, THE INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND.,
TIlE ATLANTIC CENTURY II: BENCIIMARKING EU AND U.S. INNOVATION AND COMPETITIVENEss9 (2011).
109 Id. at 5.
110 Id. at 9.
111 Id. at 11.
112 Hubbard, supra note 8, at 365-66.
104

105
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thermore, the United States has joined international treaties, like the
Patent Cooperation Treaty, that allow foreign inventors to rely on foreign patents to streamline the process of obtaining patents in the United States. 113
Consistent with these changes, foreign inventors have been acquiring U.S. patents in steadily increasing percentages. In 1963, foreign inventors accounted for just 18.6% of U.S. patents, but for the past three
years, foreign inventors have obtained more than 50% of the patents
issued by the U.S. Patent Office. 114 In 2010 alone, foreign inventors obtained 111,822 U.S. patents. ll5 To put this in perspective, if the U.S.
Patent Office had only issued patents to foreign inventors in 2010, it
would have nevertheless ranked third among patent offices in the
world based on the number of issued patents. 116
Unfortunately, it is difficult to reform U.S. patent law to improve
factor creation by U.S. firms vis-a.-vis foreign firms. In a previous article,
this Author evaluated whether traditional improvements to U.S. patent
law, like reducing the cost and duration of applying for a patent, would
improve incentives to discover new inventions more for U.S. companies
than for foreign companies. 117 If so, then these changes to U.S. patent
law would provide U.S. firms with competitive advantages by improving
113 See Patent Cooperation Treaty art. 3, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S.
231 [hereinafter Patent Cooperation Treaty]. available at http://www.wipo.int/pct/ en/
texts/articles/atoc.htm. Under the Patent Cooperation Treaty, foreign inventors can file a
patent application in their home country's patent office and then use that foreign application to draft a U.S. patent application. Id. Nonetheless. transaction costs may remain high
among less sophisticated foreign inventors. See Patenting by Organizations 2011, U.S. PAT. &
TRADEMARK Ch.... AI-I (Mar. 2012). http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/
topo_11.pdf (indicating that in 2011. 28% of individual inventors receiving U.S. patents
were foreign, but 52% of corporations receiving U.S. patents were foreign).
114 U.S. Patent Statistics, CalRndar Years 1963-2012. supra note 9.
115 Statistical Country Profiles: United States of America. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG .. http:/ /
www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/country_profile/ countries/us.html (last updated May
2013).
116 See IP Statistics Data Center. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG .• http://ipstatsdb.wipo.
org/ipstatv2/ipstats/patentsSearch (last updated Mar. 2013) [hereinafter Total Count by
Filing Office] (select "2 - Total patent grants (direct and PCT national phase entries)"
under the "Indicator" tab; then select "Total count by filing office" under the "Report
Type" tab; then select "2010" under both "Year Range" tabs; then click the "Add All" button; then click the "Submit" button). Foreign patents also provide incentives to invent. See
MICHAEL A. CARRIER. INNOVATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: HARNESSING THE POWER OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW:' (2009) (stating that patents have a "natural connection to innovation"). A competitiveness analysis of a country other than the
United States might be different than the analysis provided in this Article and would be a
fmitful topic for future research.
117 See generally Hubbard. supra note 8 (analyzing the incentives produced by possible
changes to U.S. patent law with respect to domestic and foreign inventors).
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factor conditions for U.S. firms. I concluded, however, that these typical
reforms would provide little competitive advantage to U.S. firms.lls Because the factor-creation aspects of U.S. patent law cannot be changed
to increase U.S. competitive advantage, the remainder of this Part considers the impact of U.S. patent law on a different determinant of competitive advantage: domestic rivalry.
B. Patents and General Competition

The relationships among patents, innovation, and competition are
complex. Patents can support innovation by protecting investments in
developing new technologies. They provide inventors with exclusive
rights to make, use, offer to sell, sell, or import new inventions. ll9 As a
result, patent owners can set the price of their goods or services high
enough to profit meaningfully from their investments, and competitors
cannot undercut their prices. 120 Alternatively, inventors can recover the
cost of developing a patented invention by licensing the patent. l2l Furthermore, because patents disclose substantial technological information, patents can promote subsequent innovation. 122
Unfortunately, the exclusive rights of patents also undermine
competition,123 particularly where a patent covers technology essential
to competition, such as the active ingredients in some pharmaceuti-

118 Id. at 391 (asserting that such reforms could benefit fOl'eign inventors more than
U.S. inventors because mOl'e foreign inventors utilize the U.S. patent system than U.S.
inventors and because foreign inventors may be more responsive to those reforms). This
Author also examined whether U.S. competitive advantage could be enhanced thmugh
pmtectionist patent laws and concluded that because patent law cannot (and should not)
formally favor U.S. inventors, such measures would fail to achieve that goal. Id.
119 See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (a) (2006); CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIIlEKIY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION, at xi
(2012) (stating that protection for new inventions is essential to promote innovation);
Baker, supra note 57, at 578 (noting that firms may not invest in innovation if competitors
can obtain some of the benefits fmm that innovation); Graham et aI., supra note 1, at 1283
("[P]atent monopoly is most commonly justified on the gmund of pmviding incentives to
innovate .... "). But see Graham et aI., supra note 1, at 1283 (reporting that patents sometimes "serve as only slight to moderate incentives" to invent).

120 DAN L. HURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND How THE COURTS CAN
SOLVE IT 7-8 (2009) ("If we don't do something to encourage invention by rewarding
inventors, everyone will want to be an imitator, not an inyentor.").
121 Hubbard, supra note 98, at 375.
122 See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text (discussing this obseryation).
123 See Richard C. Leyin et aI., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development, 3 HROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783, 788 (1987).
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cals. 124 Similarly, patents may be essential to an industry because they
cover technology that is incorporated in to industry standards. 125 Mter
being incorporated into an industry standard, competitors must use
this patented technology even though alternate technologies were
available before the industry standard was established. 126 With an actual
or threatened injunction prohibiting the infringement of a patent on
an essential technology in an industry, the owner of the patent may be
able to prevent another firm from effectively competing. 127 Furthermore, even when the patent owner broadly licenses a patent on an essential technology, competition may be undermined if the patent owner obtains royalties that significantly exceed the value of the patented
technology.128 Such a license raises marginal costs for the patent own-

124 See BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 119, at xv (contending that innovation often depends on shared access giving rise to competition); see also HOLllRIN & LEVINE, supra
note 1, at 8 (obsel'Ying that drugs cost five to ten times as much when they are patented as
when the patent expires and generic competitors enter the market).
125 Mark A. Lemley, IntellRctual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CALIF. L. REv. 1889, 1892-93, 1946 (2002). Industry standards are "pl'Ocedural and technical
rules generally followed by most members of an industry. Compliance with standards is
voluntary, to varying degrees ... but it may be impossible to sell products not produced in
accOl'dance with a standard." What Are Industry Standards?, WISEGEEK, http://www.wise
geek.com/what-are-industry-standards.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2013). Industry standards
cover a wide variety of pl'Oducts, including mobile phones and personal computers. Lemley, supra, at 1896. Patents on such pl'Oducts are often described as "standards essential
patents" or "SEPs." SeeJorge L. Contreras, Standards, Patents, and the National Smart Grid, 32
PACE L. REV. 641, 655 (2012). By definition, firms in a standards-based industry cannot
avoid infringing standards-essential patents. Because of the competitive pl'Oblems that can
arise with industry standards, many standard-setting organizations seek to use private
agreements to limit the capacity of patent owners to undermine competition. See Lemley,
supra, at 1948-54.
126 See HOLllRIN & LEVINE, supra note 1, at 86. Changing established standards is expensive. Id. at 87.
127 BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 120, at 29. Patent infringement is "[aln act that interferes with one of the exclusive rights of a patent ... owner." HLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 851
(9th ed. 2009).
128 See Graham et aI., supra note 1, at 1263, 1318 (reporting that entrepreneurs sometimes license patents "solely to avoid a lawsuit"). Determining the value of a patented
technology is difficult. See JAMES HESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How
JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 95-119 (2009) (explOl'ing
various ways to measure the value of patented technologies and identifying difficulties in
accurately conducting such measures). Sometimes, a technology is essential to an industry
because the technology is an impOl'tant pioneering discovery. Paying high l'Oyalties for
such a patent may not undermine competition because those royalties provide incentives
for firms to develop new technologies that can be used to compete.
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er's competitors and may foster intrafirm inefficiencies for the patent
owner, including underinvestmen t in future innovations. 129
Finally, even patents on technologies that are not central to an industry-and which thus protect only one way of competing-can affect
rivalry because they may raise costs for competitors who accidentally
infringe the patents. 130 For example, one firm may invest substantial
resources in developing a technology only to learn later that the technology infringes a rival's patent. Because independent invention is not
a defense to patent infringement,131 the infringing firm may consider
switching to a different technology to avoid patent liability. 132
Even when non-infringing alternatives are technologically possible,
however, switching technologies may be unfeasible for two reasons.
First, the costs of switching to a different technology may be substantial.
Developing a non-infringing alternative may be expensive. 133 Even
when alternative technologies are cheaply available, the cost of altering
production facilities and distribution chains to implement the noninfringing alternative may be enormous. 134 Second, a firm might avoid
infringing one patent only to infringe another. Many corporations today own massive patent portfolios,135 and determining ex ante whether
a product infringes any patent in that portfolio may be difficult, particularly because precise patent boundaries can be notoriously unclear.136 Even worse, a risk-averse firm that closely examines a patent

129 See Gerla, supra note 15, at 238-39; see supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text
(discussing intrafirm inefficiencies).
130 Such patents are common. See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink. Inc.. 547 U.S. 28.
42-43 & n.4 (2006); BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 119, at xv; see also Graham et
aI., supra note 1, at 1313 (indicating that competitors may try to invent around patents);
Levin et aI., supra note 123, at 802-03 (same).
131 BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 120, at 8.
132 See generally Christopher B. Seaman, Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard for
ReasonablR Royalt} Patent Damages, 2010 H.Y.U. L. REV. 1661 (discussing reasonable royalty
damages when there is an acceptable substitute to patented technology).
133 See id. at 1718-23 (discussing the costs of developing non-infringing alternatives).
134 See HURK & LEMLEY, supra note 120, at 29.
135 See Patenting by Organizations 2011, supra note 113, at Bl-l (noting that in 2011
alone, Samsung Electronics Co. obtained 4868 U.S. patents). Interestingly, Apple, Inc.
obtained only 676 U.S. patents in 2011. Id. at BI-2.
136 See, e.g., Gretchen Ann Bender, Uncertainty and Unpredictability in Patent Litigation:
The Time Is Right for a Consistent Claim Construction Methodology, 8 J. I NTELL PROP. L. 175, 209
(2001) ("The patent litigator cannot predict the trial or appellate court's claim construction with any certainty or confidence."); Tun-:Jen Chiang, Fixing Patent Boundaries, 108
MICH. L. REV. 523, 525 (2010) ("The normal story of patent law's boundary problems is
that claim language is too vague.").
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and later infringes it may be found to have willfully infringed the patent, thereby risking treble damages and attorney's fees. 137
In the end, paying royalties for a license to a competitor's patents
may be cheaper even if the patent owner can charge royalties that exceed the value of the patented technology.138 In the absence of a license, a firm faces switching costs and potential liability for both past
and future patent infringement. By raising marginal costs, however,
such a license may inhibit competition. 139 As Justice Anthony Kennedy
observed in the 2006 U.S. Supreme Court patent case eBay Inc. v. Mere
cExchange, L.L.G., a patent owner may use an injunction and the "potentially serious sanctions arising from its violation ... as a bargaining
tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy licenses to
practice the patent. "140
When patents undermine competition, they not only impose costs
on society, but may also retard innovation. 141 For example, because in137 See 35 U.S.c. § 284 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (establishing treble damages, which multiply compensatory damages up to three times); ROIlERT 1'. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN TIlE NEW TECIINOLOGICAL AGE 421 (6th ed. 2012) (explaining that the willfulness doctrine may disincentivize inventors from reading competitors' patents); see also In
re Seagate Tech., LLC 497 F.3d 1360, 1370-72 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (discussing the
legal standard fO!' willful patent infringement).
138 See supra notes 128-129 and accompanying text (discussing royalty payments).
139 See supra notes 128-129 and accompanying text.
140 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, j., conculTing). This concel'll may have been
ameliorated to a certain extent by the Supreme Court's eBa)' decision, which held patent
owners are not automatically entitled to injunctive relief when their patents are infringed.
Id. at 391-94 (majority opinion). Even after eBa)" however, courts may frequently enjoin
infringement. See id. at 394-95 (Roberts, C]., concurring).
141 Gerla, supra note 15, at 228-33; Levin et aI., supra note 123, at 787-88; Reichman,
supra note 103, at 1121. Scholars disagree sharply regarding the relationship between
competition and innovation. See, e.g., HOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 119, at 9 (noting that "there is probably more empirical literature on the relation between competition
and innovation than on any topic in the field of industrial organization economics").
Prominent economist Joseph Schumpeter famously argued that rivalry actually undermines innovation. Id. at 8; JOSEPH SCHUM PETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY
81-106 (3d ed. 1946); Baker, supra note 57, at 578. Rivalry, for example, causes duplicative
effort. Moreover, firms may be reluctant to invest in projects that will convey significant
benefits to rivals, like basic scientific research. See HOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note
119, at 8. Economic conditions in some industries also may favor monopolies because of
the benefits of economies of scale. For example, smaller firms find it difficult to compete
in the pharmaceutical industry because the cost of developing a new drug may be as high
as $800 million. See BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 1, at 212. In contrast to Schumpeter's
position, well-known scholars like Kenneth Arrow have argued that competition instead
provides significant incentives to innovate. Kenneth j. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in TIlE RATE AND DIRECTION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES:
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609 (Richard Nelson ed., 1962); Baker, supra note 57, at
578-79; Gerla, supra note 15, at 230 ("The empirical data indicates that it is more danger-
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dependent invention is not a defense to patent infringement, patents
can deter competitors from investing in innovation in patent-rich
fields. 142 Patents also prevent competitors from improving upon a patented invention, and some improvements could be quite significant. 143
Moreover, patent owners often face little pressure to make improvements to their patented inventions. For example, "[a] monopolist
could spend a great deal of money to make a dramatic improvementwhether by lowering cost, improving quality, or creating a new product-only to find that it does not get much additional business because
it already has most of the business there is to get. "144 Indeed, "there are
many instances when a firm that thought it had control over a broad
technology rested on its laurels until jogged to action by an outside

ous for innovation if we err on the side of too little rivalry than if we err on the side of too
much rivalry."); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson. On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 839,908 (1990). This Article does not attempt to resolve this debate, nor does this Article depend on a particular resolution to it. The primary focus of
this Article is the effect of rivalry on global competition, and numerous empirical studies
have demonstrated that domestic rivalry is critical to competitive advantage. Bakel', supra
note 57, at 585-86 & n.29 (collecting studies). For example, Michael Porter's empirical
study of competition in global markets "casts grave doubts" on the claim that monopoly
fosters competitive advantage. See PORTER, supra note 3, at 117 ("A look at the successful
industries in the ten nations we studied ... belie[s] the simple notion that world leadership grows out of one or two firms who reap economies of scale in the home market.").
142 See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 120, at 8. At the same time, an overabundance of
patents can force competitors to engage in defensive patenting. For example, one competitor might obtain patents solely to be able to assert them in retaliation to patent claims
by another competitor. See Julie Samuels, The Defensive Patent License and Other Ways to Beat
the Patent System, Eu:c. FRONTIER FOUND. (June 10, 2012), https:!/www.eff.org/deeplinks/
2012/061 defensive-paten t-license-and-other-ways-beat-paten t-system (defining defensive
patenting as "acquiring patents to deter future litigation" and explaining that "the practice
has encouraged companies to seek patents for anything and everything, which-thanks to
an overburdened Patent Office-has resulted in a generation of overbroad patents").
Overabundant patents can also lead to cross-licensing. ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND iTs DISCONTENTS: How OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM Is ENDANGERING
INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO Do AIlOUT IT 59-60 (2004); see also BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 127, at 1003 (stating that cross-licensing occurs when "two or
more [patent owners agree] to exchange licenses for their mutual benefit and use of the
licensed products").
143 Merges & Nelson, supra note 141, at 870.
144 Baker, supra note 57, at 578.
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threat. "145 Competition thus can help to speed the development of improvements of existing technology. 146
Because patents both encourage invention and undermine competition, lawmakers must carefully tailor patent rights to balance these
competing concerns. 147 The scope of protection afforded to patents is
critical to achieving this balance. Patent scope depends on numerous
factors, including the duration of patents; the types of discoveries eligible for patent protection; the breadth of judicial interpretation of the
language in patents; the bases on which patents can be invalidated; and
the remedies awarded for patent infringement. 148 Increasing the scope
of protection-by, for example, substantially extending the duration of
patents-might provide greater incentives to innovate, but would probably obstruct follow-on innovation and inhibit competition to a greater
extent. The social utility of a potential change in patent scope thus will
depend on the marginal costs and benefits of the change. 149 At least in
theory, the intersection between marginal cost and marginal benefit
curves determines the optimal level of patent protection. 150 Unfortunately, rigorously comparing these marginal costs and benefits is difficult, if not impossible, because they cannot be measured empirically. 151

145 Merges & Nelson, supra note 141, at 872. Another way in which patents may reduce
the incentive to innovate for patent owners is because "rivalry may promote the elimination of internal inefficiencies which hinder the ability of finns to pmfit fmm innovations
they create." Gerla, supra note 15, at 229-30.
146 See Merges & Nelson, supra note 141, at 878 (noting that "society prefers to have
improvements now rather than later").
147 BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 120, at 8. Other areas of law pmyide only limited help
in this balancing. For example, antitrust liability typically does not extend to the assertion
of lawfully acquired patent rights. Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1346 (Fed.
Cir.2007).
148 See generally Merges & Nelson, supra note 141 (evaluating doctrines of patent scope).
149 Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1813,
1825 n.29 (1984).
150 See generally Tim Worstall, The Tabarrok Curve: Why the Patent System Is Not Fit for Purpose, FORBES (June 23, 2013, 9:39 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/20l3/
06/23 / the-tabarmk-curve-why-the-patent-system-is-not-fit-fOl'-purpose / (embracing a costbenefit analysis of patent pmtection).
151 See FRITZ MALCIIUP, SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGIITS OF
TIlE S. COMM. ON TIlE JUDICIARY, Sf)TII CONG., STUDY No. If), AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF
tHE PATENT SYSTEM 80 (Comm. Print 1958). Economist Fritz Malchup famously concluded his study of the U.S. patent system unsure of its social utility:

If one does not know whether a system "as a whole" (in contrast to certain
features of it) is good 01' bad, the safest "policy conclusion" is to "muddle
thmugh" -either with it, if one has long lived with it, 01' without it, if one has
lived without it. If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible,
on the basis of our present knowledge of its economic consequences, to rec-
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U.S. Patents and Competition by U.S. Firms

A U.S. patent prevents competitors from making, using, selling,
offering to sell, and importing infringing technology in the United
States. 152 As a result, U.S. patents not only restrict the commercial activities of U.S.-headquartered firms, which conduct many of their activities in the United States, but also restrict competition by firms founded
abroad that conduct business in the United States. 153 Nevertheless, because of limits on the extraterritoriality of U.S. law, much of the commercial activity conducted by foreign firms occurs beyond the reach of
U.S. patent law. 154 U.S. patents, therefore, do not impact foreign firms
as much as they affect U.S. firms, and U.S. patents consequently undermine U.S. competitive advantage in two respects.
First, U.S. patents limit competition by U.S. firms in global markets. Often, foreign firms can cheaply avoid liability for infringing a
U.S. patent simply by performing certain commercial activities outside
of the United States, and U.S. firms face comparatively greater costs in
conducting commercial activities outside the United States. For example, a Chinese firm could avoid infringing a U.S. patent by manufacturing and selling its products outside of the United States. For a U.S.
company to similarly sidestep a U.S. patent, it would need to establish

ommend instituting one. But since we have had a patent system for a long
time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge, to recommend abolishing it.
Id.
152

35 U.S.c. § 271 (a) (2006).
See BESS EN & MUERER. supra note 128. at 140 (noting that "a lawsuit filed in the
United States might result in a settlement that covers worldwide business").
154 See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 527 (1972) (holding that
under U.S. patent law "it is not an infringement to make or use a patented product outside
of the United States"); NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1313 (Fed. Cir.
2005) ("Section 271(a) [of Title 35] is only actionable against patent infringement that
occurs within the United States."). Although U.S. patent law generally lacks extraterritorial
effect, U.S. patent law may affect conduct in foreign jurisdictions when foreign activities
have a sufficient nexus with the United States. For example. if a foreign firm imports a
product into the United States that was produced by a patented process, that firm may be
liable for patent infringement even if the process was used entirely outside of the United
States. 35 U.S.C § 271(g); see also NTP, 418 F.3d at 1317 (holding that, even if part of a
patented system is located outside of the United States, the system is "used" in the United
States if "control of the system is exercised and beneficial use of the system obtained" in
the United States). Even in this situation, however, a successful patent owner may not be
able to assert a U.S. patent infringement judgment against a firm's foreign assets. See Robert C. Casad, Issue Preclusion and Foreign Countr)'Judgments: Whose Law?, 70 IOWA L. REv. 53,
75 (1984) (indicating that foreign jurisdictions may not give U.S. judgments preclusive
effect) .
153

1936

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 54:1909

or enlarge its commercial presence outside of the United States, thereby raising costs for the U.S. firm and reducing the extent to which the
firm contributes to the U.S. economy.155
Second, by restricting the commercial activities of U.S. firms, U.S.
patents inhibit competition among U.S. firms. In limited respects, U.S.
patents can affect rivalry among foreign firms, at least to the extent that
foreign firms compete with each other for sales in the United States. A
U.S. patent owned by one Japanese company, for instance, could limit
the ability of another Japanese company to compete for U.S. sales.
Nevertheless, U.S. patents affect rivalry among foreign firms less in
their home countries because central aspects of their businesses take
place beyond the reach of U.S. patent law. 156 With less domestic rivalry
to hone their competitive edges, U.S. firms are less prepared to compete in global markets. 157
To some extent, foreign patents limit competition by and among
foreign firms as well. Indeed, important inventions are often patented
in many countries. 15S Nevertheless, in two respects U.S. patents reduce
U.S. competitiveness more than foreign patents limit foreign competitiveness.
First, the extent to which a patent limits domestic rivalry in a country depends upon the scope of protection afforded to patents in that
country, and U.S. patent law generally provides broader rights than
many foreign patent systems. 159 Other countries typically have been
155 The Wright brothers' U.S. patent on basic airplane technology may provide an example of this phenomenon. Some commentators have argued that the i!\Tright brothers'
aggressive assertion of their U.S. patent allowed for the development of the aviation industry in France. HOLIlRIN & LEVINE, supra note 1, at 87-88; see also id. at 219 (asserting that
"the slow growth of the coloring industry in the United States before the First i!\Todd War
was largely due to patent protection: most [U.S.] patents were held by the large German
companies") .
156 See supra note 154 and accompanying text (discussing the limited reach of U.S. patent law on foreign corporations).
157 See supra notes 68-90 and accompanying text (illustrating how domestic rivalry fosters competitive advantage).
158 In fact, the United States (along with more than 140 other countries) has signed
the Patent Cooperation Treaty, which allows an inventor to use a patent application in one
country to streamline the patent application processes in other countries. See Patent Cooperation Treaty, supra note 103, art. 3; Contracting Parties, WORLIl INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/ en/ShowResultsJsp?lang=en&treaty_id=6 (last visited Nov.
17,2013) (check the "Patent Cooperation Treaty" box; then click the "Search" button).
159 Some research indicates that "the level of intellectual property protection increases
with a country's real gross domestic product per capita." COUNCIL 01' ECON. AIlVISERS,
supra note 4, at 225. As described in more detail below, the scope of patent protection in
the United States has increased in many ways in recent years. See infra notes 200-206 and
accompanying text.
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more reluctant to expand the rights of patent owners, so that "[mJost
indices of the strength of intellectual property protection tend to show
that the United States is among the countries with the highest level of
protection. "160 Consequently, even if the same technology is protected
by patents in both the United States and foreign jurisdictions, the harm
to competition is more pronounced in the United States.
Second, foreign inventions are protected by patents in the United
States-all things being equal-more than in many other countries. 161
Because the United States is the largest consumer market in the world
and because only U.S. patents can be asserted in this market, many foreign firms highly value U.S. patents. 162 Moreover, as described above,
the transaction costs for a foreign inventor to obtain a U.S. patent have
recently decreased. 163 As a result of the value and increasing ease of
obtaining U.S. patents, foreign inventors have been obtaining U.S. patents in record numbers.164 In contrast, inventors worldwide are not
flocking to many other countries. Excluding patenting in the United
States, nonresident inventors in 2010 accounted for only 36% of paten ts across all patent offices worldwide. 165 N onresiden t patenting in
some patent-intensive countries is much lower than this global average.
For instance, in 2010 nonresident inventors obtained only 16% ofJapanese patents and only 25% of Korean patents. 166 Similarly, in 2011,
160 COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 4, at 225; see also Kapczynski, supra note 7,
1588-1616 (demonstrating that patent protections in India are weaker than protections in
the United States. particularly for pharmaceutical inventions).
161 See U.S. Patent Statistics. Calendar Yean 1963-2012, supra note 9.
162 See id. (showing that the U.S. Patent Office has issued more patents to foreigners
than to U.S. residents in recent years); see also Voda v. Cordis Corp .. 476 F.3d 887. 889-90
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that foreign patents cannot be asserted in the United States);
World Top Consumer Markets Ranking. supra note 9 (ranking the United States as the top
consumer market).
163 See supra notes 112-113 and accompanying text.
164 See U.S. Patent Statistics, Calendar Years 1963-2012. supra note 9.
165 See IP Statistics Data Center. supra note 116 [hereinafter Total Count by Applicant's
Origin and Filing Office] (select "2 - Total patent grants (direct and PCT national phase
entries)" under the "Indicator" tab; then select "Count by applicant's origin and by filing
office" under the "Report Type" tab; then select "2010" under both "Year Range" tabs;
then click the "Add All" button under both "Select Origin" and "Select Office" categories;
then click the "Submit" button).
166 Id. The only other major patent office that issues close to 50% of its patents to foreign inventors is the European Patent Office. Id. The reason for this high rate of foreign
inventor patenting is likely similar to the U.S. explanation: the European Union is a massive consumer market. and there are few barriers to foreign inventors obtaining patents
from the European Patent Office. See DELOITTE, CONSUMER 2020: READING TIlE SIGNS 7
(2011).
https:/ /www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-GlobaI/Local%20Assets/Documents/
Consumer% 20Business/ 8664A_ Consumer2020_ sg8. pdf (massive consumer market); David
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79% of the patent applications received by the State Intellectual Property Office of the People's Republic of China came from residents. 167
Despite the low percentage of nonresident patentees, some foreign countries issue large numbers of patents to resident inventors.
These patents can limit competition by and among firms in those countries, thereby reducing their competitive advantage. For example, in
2010, Japan issued 187,237 Japanese patents to Japanese inventors,
which is more than three times the number of patents that the European Patent Office issued that year. 168 Nevertheless, patents issued to
residents also arguably bolster competitive advantage by providing residents with exclusive rights to discoveries in that country. 169 In contrast,
when the U.S. Patent Office issues a U.S. patent to a foreign inventor,
competition by and among U.S. firms is limited even though U.S. firms
may not obtain exclusive access to the new invention.
Thus, with more foreign inventors obtaining U.S. patents and with
U.S. patent law providing more robust rights than many foreign patent
laws, U.S. patents limit competition more in the United States than foreign patents limit competition in other countries. This reduced competition in the United States ultimately undermines U.S. competitive advantage.

D. CUTTent Appmaches to

us. Patent Law and Us.

Competitive Advantage

Policymakers recognize that enhancing U.S. competitiveness is
important and that patent law can affect competitive advantage. 170 BeMeyel; 'Troll' Warning as EU Gets Unitary Patent Scheme, After Decades of Failure, ZDNET (Dec.
20, 2012, 9:36 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/troll-warning-as-eu-gets-unitary-patent-schemeaftel~decades-of-failure-7000008672/ (arguing that new European Union rules will make it
too easy to obtain an EU patent); see also Jerzy Koopman, The Patentamlity of Transgenic Animals in the United States of America and the European Union: A Proposal for Harmonization, 13
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L..J. 103, 200 (2002) (stating that patents on transgenic animals can be obtained in a way that such patents in the United States cannot).
167 Daniel Pruzin, IkoOMIIERG LAW, u.N. Agency Says China Top Recipient for Patent,
Trademark, Design Applications, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY, Dec. 12, 2012, at 1,1-2.
The term "resident filers" includes "Chinese firms as well as foreign firms with an established presence in China through which the applications were filed." Id.
168 Total Count by Applicant's Origin and Filing Office, supra note 165.
169 A foreign inventor may also be able to use a foreign patent to obtain patent rights
in other countries under the Patent Cooperation Treaty noted above. See Patent Cooperation Treaty, supra note 113, art. 3; supra note 113 and accompanying text.
170 See 157 Cow;. lhc. S5433 (dailyed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Mark Kirk)
(stating that legislation that "strengthen[s] our patent system ... [will] bolster our global
competiveness [sic]"); 153 CONGo REc. 23706 (2007) (arguing that legislation resulting in
weaker patent protection "is a severe threat to American innovation, American jobs and
American competitiveness"); 143 CONGo lh:c. 4359 (1997) ("[W]e have had the strongest
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cause policymakers have misunderstood the impact of U.S. patents on
U.S. competitive advantage, however, they have sought to increase U.S.
competitiveness through two fundamentally flawed approaches.
First, lawmakers have sought to increase U.S. competitive advantage by strengthening the protections offered by U.S. patents and thus
(it is hoped) increasing incentives for U.S. firms to discover new inventions. l7l As discussed above, however, foreign inventors frequently obtain U.S. patents, and enlarged incentives created through stronger
U.S. patents generally will inure to the benefit of both domestic and
foreign firms.172 In fact, because stronger patent rights are more valuable, strengthening U.S. patent rights will encourage more foreign
firms to obtain U.S. patents. 173 Unlike the benefits of stronger U.S. patent rights, the competitive harms of stronger U.S. patents disproportionately impact U.S. firms.174 As a result, increasing the strength of
U.S. patent protection may eventually harm competition by and among
U.S. firms such that U.S. competitiveness will decrease. This Article argues below, in Part III, that U.S. patent law has already passed this tipping point. 175
The second approach traditionally adopted by U.S. lawmakers attempting to use patent law to increase U.S. competitiveness is to
strengthen foreign patent law to match the protections provided by
U.S. patent law-so called "upward harmonization."176 Many lawmakers
and businesses believe that strengthening patent law in foreign coun-

patent protection of any country of the world, and that is what has ensured the American
people for these last 200 years the ability to have a higher standard of living than other
countries of the world, because we were able to out-compete them."); 131 CONGo Ih:c.
21739 (1985) (stating that "strengthening intellectual property rights was cited as a major
prescription for ensuring America's continued prosperity and economic competitiveness").
171 See supra note 170 and accompanying text (collecting congressional records ).
172 See supra notes 159-169 and accompanying text; see also Thomas H. Case & Scott R.
Miller, An Appraisal of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 57 S. CAL. L REV. 301, 322
(1984) ("American patents that are issued to foreigners benefit the inventor regardless of
nationality.") .
173 See AUGUSTINE, supra note 35, at 61. All things being equal, patents in a smaller
economy are generally less valuable because they impact less economic activity.
174 See supra notes 152-169 and accompanying text (describing the unique harms suffered by U.S. firms pursuant to strong U.S. patent laws).
175 See infra notes 198-216 and accompanying text.
176 S. REP. No. 104-394, at 6 (1996) ("For more than a decade, a major objective of
U.S. international trade negotiations has been strengthening intellectual property protections worldwide."); see also Kapczynski, supra note 7, at 1571. Harmonization, more generally, has been defined as "the adoption of standards or agreements that bring state practices closer to one another." Kapczynski, supra note 7, at 1572 n.4.
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tries ''will be critically important to the success of [U.S.] firms and the
American economy."177 To this end, the United States has been a major
proponent of international treaties that require signatories to provide
robust patent protection. 17S For example, the United States was a driving force behind TRIPS, which established minimum levels of intellectual property protection in all countries that are members of the World
Trade Organization (WTO).179 To ensure compliance with TRIPS, the
United States has initiated WTO dispute resolution proceedings, including actions against BraziPso and China. lSI In fact, the United States
has initiated numerous dispute resolution proceedings under TRIPSmore than all of the other WTO member countries combined. ls2 Furthermore, to strengthen the protection of intellectual property beyond

177 Peter K. Yu, The Rise and Decline of the Intellectual Property Powers, 34 CAMPBELL L.
REV. 525. 549 (2012); accord HOLIlRIN & LEVINE. supra note 1, at 174, 246. Peter Yu notes
that the United States is "one of the predominant intellectual property powers pushing for
stronger levels of protection and enforcement around the world." Yu, supra, at 541.
178 For example, in 2012, the chair of the House Subcommittee on Intellectual Property, Competition, and the Internet stated that the United States should use negotiations
with numerous Asian countries to generate "stronger, not weaker commitments by other
countries to enhance their IP laws." Tamlin H. Bason, HLOOMIIERG LAW, House Subcommittee
Questions IP Czar on Trade Secret Theft, Counterfeit Drugs, DAILY REp. FOR EXECS., Sept. 24,
2012, at 1, 1-2 (quoting Rep. Robert W. Goodlatte).
179 John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 HERKELEY TECH. LJ.
685,695-96 (2002); Kapczynski, supra note 7, at 1579; Yu, supra note 177, at 541; see S. REp.
No. 104-394, at 6 ("During the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations, the United
States persistently sought to include international protection of intellectual property as an
element of free trade. This was at the top of our trade agenda and was considered to be an
essential ingredient for a successful agreement."); 140 CONGo Ih:c. 29660 (1994) (asserting
that TRIPS "save[s] us billions with stronger intellectual property rights which will protect
our most competitive industries"); 140 CONGo REc. 12573 (1994) (arguing that TRIPS is
"of great importance to our Nation's global competitiveness and innovative strength"). See
generally TRIPS, supra note 102 (establishing international intellectual property standards).
180 Request fOJ' the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, Brazil-Measures Affecting Patent Protection, WT/DSI99/3 (Jan. 9, 2001). Mter the WTO constituted a panel to
resolve the issue, the United States and Brazil settled. Notification of Mutually Agreed
Solution, Brazil-Measures Affecting Patent Protection, WT /DSI99/4 (July 19,2001).
181 Request for Consultations by the United States, China-Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT /DS362/1 (Apr. 16, 2007); see also Peter
K. Yu, The U.S.-China Dispute over TRIPS Enforcement, 5 OCCASIONAL PAPERS IN INTELL.
PROP. L. 1, 20, 23 (2010) (reporting that the United States did not prevail on many of its
claims in its dispute with China).
182 Dispute Settlement: The Disputes, Disputes by Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG., http:! /
www.wto.OJ.g/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_agreements_index_e.htm?id=A26#selected_
agreement (last visited Aug. 19, 2013). The United States has also been the target of patentrelated WTO proceedings. See, e.g., Request for Consultations by Brazil, United States-US
Patents Code, WT/DS224/1 (Feb. 7, 2001) (challenging U.S. patent law regarding inventions
made with federal assistance).
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the minimum provided by TRIPS, the United States has also pursued
additional treaties with its trade partners. 183
In addition to the campaign to strengthen intellectual property
rights generally, the United States has also embarked on a campaign "to
strengthen [the] enforcement of intellectual property rights internationally. "184 Under the Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Attache Program,
the U.S. Patent Office stations representatives of the U.S. Patent Office
in countries around the world and charges these attaches with "encourag[ing] strong IPR protection and enforcement by U.S. trading
partners for the benefit of U.S. rights holders. "185 Similarly, in 2011, the
FBI placed an agent in Beijing, China to help quell intellectual property crime. 186 The United States has also helped to train patent examiners in foreign jurisdictions. 187
Strengthening the scope and enforcement of foreign patent law
might in some respects increase the competitive advantage of U.S.
firms by allowing U.S. firms to better exploit differences in advanced
factors of production (e.g., inventions) and by equalizing the competitive conditions for foreign and U.S. firms. Many foreign countries,
however, have been reluctant to change their laws. For example, the
negotiations that ultimately produced TRIPS were "highly contentious. "188 As a result, although TRIPS established minimum levels of
patent protection, the treaty nevertheless allows countries to adopt patent protections much weaker than those in the United States. 189 Efforts
by the United States to negotiate additional treaties that strengthen
foreign patent law have often met stiff resistance. For example, the
United States attempted to "set a new and higher benchmark for international intellectual property enforcement" through a multilateral treaty en titled the An ti-Coun terfeiting Trade Agreement ("ACTA") .190

183 Kapczynski, supra note 7, at 1640.
184 OFFICE 01' THE PRESIIlENT, 2010 JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT 14 (2010) (emphasis added).
185 Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Attaclui Progra17t, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (July
30,2013,3:24 PM), http://www.uspto.gov/ip/globai/attache/indexJsp.
186 International IP Enforcernent: Opening Marhets Abroad and Protecting Innovation: Hearing
Before the SUbC017l17l. on IntellRctual Prop., Competition, and the Internet of the H. C017lm. on the
judiciary, 112th Congo 14 (2012) (statement of Victoria A. Espinel).
187 Kapczynski, supra note 7, at 1624.
188 Yu, supra note 13, at 980; see also Kapczynski, supra note 7, at 1580-81 (describing
opposition to TRIPS by developing countries).
189 See Kapczynski, supra note 7, at 1643.
190 Peter K. Yu, Of ACTA/TPP and SOPA/PIPA, 7 OCCASIONAL PAPERS IN INTELL. PROP.
L. 1,3 (2012).
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Concerns that ACTA's protection of intellectual property overreached
eventually sparked protests worldwide. 191
The reasons that many foreign jurisdictions do not embrace more
stringent patent protection are complex, but one reason may be that
the economies of these countries are better served by patent laws that
focus more on encouraging competition than on providing incentives
to inyent. 192 Indeed, foreign jurisdictions are more likely to focus on
competition in their patent laws because U.S. patents provide foreign
inventors with significant incentives to invent. 193 Strong U.S. patent law
thus undermines incentives for foreign jurisdictions to strengthen foreign patent laws. 194
III. WEAKENING U.S. PATENTS TO INCREASE U.S. COMPETITIVENESS
A. Efftcts of Weakening

u.s. Patent Law

Weakening U.S. patent protection can increase U.S. competItIve
advantage by addressing the asymmetry in U.S. patents described
above: U.S. patents provide incentives to innovate for both foreign and
191 DavidJolly, Intellectual Property Pact Draws Fire in Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2012, at
B5. Following this public opposition, the European Parliament rejected the treaty. Pfanner,
supra note 13.
192 See Yu, supra note 13, at 980 (noting that "the perspectives of developed and lessdeveloped countries on the role of intellectual property protection and enforcement remain far apart").
193 Compare HURK & LEMLEY, supra note 120, at 8 (indicating that patents can incentivize innovation but can also constrain competition), with Hubbard, supra note 8, at 356-58
(chronicling the movement away from protectionism in U.S. patent law and recognizing
that the trend has tended to harmonize U.S. and foreign incentives to innovate).
194 One alternative to encouraging foreign countries to strengthen their patent laws
would be to increase the rate at which U.S. inventors obtain foreign patents. If more U.S.
inventors obtained and enforced foreign patents, rivalry in the countries issuing those
patents might decline. Transaction costs like language barriers may be one reason that
U.S. inventors infrequently obtain foreign patents. The United States could encourage
such foreign patenting by U.S. inventors by subsidizing the cost of applying for foreign
patents, as some countries already do for their inventors. See Tony Dutra, BLOOMBERG LAw,
PTO Reports on Small Business International Rejects Taxpayer-Funded Options, PAT., TRADEMARK,
& COPYRIGHT]', Sept. 20, 2013, at 30,30-31. Even if more U.S. inventors obtained more
patents in foreign jurisdictions, howeve1; they may not enforce them. Attempting to enforce patents in jurisdictions with weak patent laws may provide little return for the patent
owners. Moreover, even when enforcement could provide meaningful relief, patent litigation is very expensive, particularly if that litigation is conducted in a foreign country, and
U.S. inventors will not enforce foreign patents if the costs of doing so exceed the expected
benefits. Indeed, enforcement issues are a major reason that inventors often do not seek
patent protection for their discoveries. Graham et aI., supra note 1, at 1310; see Levin et aI.,
supra note 123, at 803 (reporting that lack of enforcement by firms is perceived to weaken
the effectiveness of patents).
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U.S. firms, but harm U.S. competition more than foreign competition. 195 As a result, weakening U.S. patents would increase competition
among U.S. firms more than among foreign firms, and this differential
would in this respect help U.S. firms compete more effectively against
foreign riyals. But weakening U.S. patent protection will also reduce
incentives to inyent. 196 Thus, to maximize U.S. competitiveness, U.S.
lawmakers should seek to establish an optimum level of patent protection in the United States that will efficiently balance all costs and benefits, including those related to competitive advantage. 197 Unfortunately,
determining this optimal level is difficult because empirical obstacles
preven t rigorous comparisons of costs and benefits. 198
Despite these empirical challenges, it is likely that U.S. patent protection currently exceeds optimal levels. Policymakers have overstated
the extent to which U.S. patents foster U.S. competitiveness by touting
the factor-creation effects of U.S. patents for U.S. firms while ignoring
the incentives to invent that U.S. patents provide to foreign firms. At the
same time, lawmakers have not recognized that the disproportionate
harm U.S. patents cause to domestic rivalry in the United States undermines U.S. competitiveness. By overestimating the benefits of U.S.
patents while simultaneously underestimating the costs, U.S. lawmakers
likely have established a level of patent protection in the United States
above the level that would maximize U.S. competitive adyantage. 199
Indeed, for decades, U.S. lawmakers have strengthened patent
protection in the United States, arguing that such changes would in-

195 See supra notes 159-169 and accompanying text (illustrating this disparity). Patents
can be weakened either by reducing the scope of protection afforded to U.S. patents or by
making U.S. patents harder to obtain.
196 Anton et aI., supra note 5, at 8 ("Generally, weak property rights reduce the prize
available to a patent holder.").
197 HURK & LEMLEY, supra note 120, at 8. Even when the scope of protection for issued
patents is optimally calibrated, U.S. patent law can undermine U.S. competitive advantage
if the U.S. Patent Office fails to correctly apply the standards for issuing patents, such as
when trivial advances over existing technology receive patent protection. Patents on such
minor inventions will undermine competition by and among U.S. finns but will not encourage U.S. firms to discover commercially significant technological information. Consequently, patents on trivial technological advancements will undermine competitive advantage in the United States.
198 See FRITZ, supra note 152, at 80 (remarking on the inability to empirically measure
the costs and benefits of the U.S. patent system); supra notes 147-151 and accompanying
text (illustrating the importance of striking a proper balance but observing the empirical
impossibility of doing so).
199 See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
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crease U.S. competitiYeness. 2oo Thirty-fiye years ago, genetically modified organisms, software, and business methods were largely ineligible
for patent protection, but discoveries in each of these areas are frequently patented today.20l U.S. patent law is also less likely to hold patents invalid than foreign patent systems. For example, under U.S. patent law, an inventor can publicly disclose an invention for up to one
year before submitting a patent application. 202 In most other countries,
public disclosure of an invention at any time before the filing of a patent application will usually invalidate a patent. 203 Building on a "consensus for stronger [U.S.] patent protection," Congress established the

200 See Keith Bentele & Alexander Ibsen, Exploring the Patent Surge: Increased Incentives or
Multiplying Motives?, 95 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK 01'1'. SOC'y 99, 100 (2013) (stating that U.S.
patent protection has been strengthened during the past three decades); supra notes 4-7
and accompanying text. This one-sided approach has tempered recently to reflect a greater emphasis on optimally calibrating patent strength. For example, in a 2006 report, the
Council of Economic Advisers to the President asserted that "[ w1ell-defined and wellenforced intellectual property rights are an important component of the U.S. economy
and an important element in fostering continued economic growth." COUNCIL 01' ECON.
ADVISERS, supra note 4, at 229; see also COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 5, at 81
(stating that the United States "cannot afford to rest on its laurels as the leading innovation economy in the world"). Likewise, in 2012, the Council of Economic Advisers to the
President noted that "many observers have raised concerns about the U.S. patent system."
COUNCIL m ECON. ADVISERS, THE ECONOMIC REpORT OF TIlE PRESIDENT 246 (2012). Nevertheless, while lawmakers have changed their rhetorical emphasis, they have not advocated for rolling back the expansions in patent strength from the last few decades. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text (illustrating U.S. policymakers' devotion to a strong
patent system).
201 See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3228 (2010) (holding that some business
methods may be patented); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 318 (1980) (conferring
patent protection on organisms produced by genetic engineering); State St. Bank & Trust
Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that a data
processing system is a patentable invention). In 1988, Congress also expanded the definition of infringement under the Patent Act to include the importation of a product "which
is made from a process patented in the United States." Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 9005(a), 102 Stat. 1107 (codified as amended at 35
U.S.c. § 295 (2006)).
202 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). The Leahy-Smith America Invents
Act recently changed some of the details of this one-year grace period. Pub. L. No. 112-29,
sec. 3(b), § 102(b), 125 Stat. 284, 286 (2011) (codified at 35 U.S.c. § 102(b) (2006 &
Supp. V 2011)). Before the Act, an inventOl"s public use of an invention would only ilwalidate a patent if the use took place "more than one year prior to the date of the application
for patent in the United States." 35 U.S.c. § 102(b) (2006) (amended 2011). Under the
new law, public use of an invention will invalidate a patent if it took place "befOl'e the effective filing date" of a patent application, but public use by the inventOl' during the year
preceding the filing of a patent application does not invalidate the patent. 35 U.S.c.
§ 102(a)-(b) (2006 & Supp. V2011).
203 See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Note, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARVARD J.L. & TECH. 545, 591 n.220 (2012).
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U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982 and granted this
court exclusive jurisdiction over all appeals arising under U.S. patent
law. 204 In the eyes of many observers, the Federal Circuit has strengthened patent law by construing patents broadly, narrowing the grounds
for invalidating patents, and limiting some defenses to patent infringement. 205 As a result, it is more likely that patents will be deemed
valid today than in the past. 206 Because other countries have not followed suit, the scope of protection under U.S. patent law now exceeds
that of many other countries. 207
In light of these expansions to U.S. patent protection, a growing
group of scholars and jurists have begun to assert that the costs of paten t
protection in the United States exceed the benefits.208 Some prominent
scholars have argued that during the late 1990s, patents likely "provided
a net disincentive to innovation outside the chemical and pharmaceutical industries. "209 These scholars have concluded that without the U.S.
patent system, "[t]he rate of innovation and technological progress
204 HOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 119, at 61; see also HURK & LEMLEV, supra
note 120, at 3 (describing the "consensus in favor of strong patent protection that has existed since the 1982 creation of the Federal Circuit").
205 See MERGES ET AL., supra note 137, at 128 n.17 (collecting citations regarding empirical studies showing the strengthening of patent rights); see also, e.g., Therasense, Inc. v.
Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1288-90 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en bane) (restricting
the availability of equitable defenses to patent infringement).
206 MERGES ET AL., supra note 137, at 128.
207 See supra notes 188-191 and accompanying text (illustrating resistance by foreign
corporations to increases in intellectual property protections). Compare, e.g., Opinion of
the Economic and Social Committee on the 'Proposal for a European Parliament and
Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions,' 1996 OJ (C
295) 11 [hereinafter EU Opinion Regarding Biotechnological Innovation] (evaluating
whether the availability of patent rights for biotechnology inventions helped U.S. interests
excel in biotechnology research), and HOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 1, at 46 (observing
that business practices and financial securities are patentable in the United States), with
European Patent Convention art. 52, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 255 (stating that "methods for ... doing business" are not eligible for patent protection), and Harvard ColI. v.
Canada, [2002] 4 S.c.R. 45 (Can.) ("Patenting higher life forms would involve a radical
departure from the traditional patent regime."). Concededly, some expansions of the
scope of U.S. patent law may increase U.S. competitive advantage by improving incentives
to invent. See, e.g., EU Opinion Regarding Biotechnology Innovation supra, at 11 (considering whether patents on biotechnological inventions bolstered biotechnology research).
208 See HOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 119, at 60 (suggesting that "the U.S. patent system is in crisis" and observing that "[i] t has been subjected to withering attacks by
critics of every political stripe"); BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 120, at 21 ("Public policy circles are replete with arguments that the patent system is broken, perhaps irretrievably.");
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 2, at 21 (noting that "the high social costs of intellectual
property rights create uncertainty as to whether on balance such rights are, from an overall social standpoint, costjustified at all").
209 HESSEN & MEURER, supra note 128, at 142.
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might have been even greater, perhaps much greater. "210 Other prominent scholars have conducted similar analyses of the costs and benefits
of the patent system and concluded that U.S. patent law is "in crisis"211
and "broke. "212 These scholars have argued that patent law is "an unnecessary evil, "213 and that "abolishing intellectual property protection
is the only socially responsible thing to do. "214 Jurists have also begun to
express their concern regarding the tradeoff struck by U.S. patent law.
Judge and scholar Richard Posner recently stated, "It's not clear that we
really need patents in most industries."215
Significantly, these critiques of U.S. patent law have not considered
the harmful impact of U.S. patents on U.S. competitiveness. If the assessments of these commentators are correct and U.S. patent law needs
reform without considering the impact of U.S. patents on U.S. competitive advantage, then change is certainly warranted under a more comprehensive analysis. Competitiveness analysis thus both corroborates
and provides additional evidence for these analyses. 216 When all of
these critiques are considered alongside lawmakers' incomplete understanding of the impact of U.S. patent law on U.S. competitiveness, it
appears likely that U.S. patent protection should be weakened in order
to maximize U.S. competitive advantage.

Id. at 146.
HURK & LEMLEY. supra note 120, at 3.
212 See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 142, at 1; see also CARRIER, supra note 116, at 1 ("Innovation ... has been threatened in recent years. Part of the blame, surprisingly enough,
lies with the U.S. legal system."); Graham et aI., supra note 1, at 1263 ("On the whole,
technology entrepreneurs tell us that the patent system is neither working particularly
poorly nor well for their companies and industries.").
213 HOLllRIN & LEVINE, supra note 1, at 3; see also Don Tiller, Devaluing Invention: The
Push for Patent Reform, 14 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REv. 119, 121 (2007) ("Recently, it has been
argued that the U.S. patent system is broken and has become a social burden, merely serving to grant unnecessary economic monopolies at the expense of consumers without creating an extra incentive to invent; or worse, that the patent system actually reduces incentive
to invent.").
214 HOLllRIN & LEVINE, supra note 1, at 243-44.
215 John Bl'Odkin, Judge Who Threw Out Apple/Mota Case Calls Patent Litigants "Animals,"
ARs TECHNICA Quly 5, 2012, 11:35 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/07/
judge-who-threw-out-applemoto-case-calls-patent-litigants-animals/. Judge Posner made these
comments shortly after he dismissed patent claims and counterclaims in a suit between
technological powerhouses Apple, Inc. and Motorola, Inc. See generally Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (dismissing patent lawsuit in its entirety).
216 Cf BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 120, at 21 ("[WJhen that many people with that
many different perspectives have decided that something is wrong, it is time to sit up and
take notice.").
210
211
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B. Cost/Benefit Recalibrations to U.S. Patent Law

Although the impact of U.S. patent law on domestic rivalry has
been largely overlooked, commentators have long recognized that patents generally promote innovation but undermine competition and
that many patent law doctrines affect this tradeoff.217 Despite agreemen t on the existence of this tradeoff, scholars disagree about whether
reforms to U.S. patent law will improve or worsen it. By identifYing additional costs inherent in current U.S. patent law-including the harms
to U.S. competitiveness stemming from reduced domestic rivalry-the
analysis of competitive advantage provides additional support for some
of these reforms.
For example, some scholars argue that inventors should be required to provide more information regarding their inventions in their
patent applications. 218 This additional information could provide better notice regarding the scope of patent rights and thus help competitors develop non-infringing alternatives to patented technologies. On
the other hand, requiring patent applicants to provide additional information would raise costs for inventors, thereby reducing incentives
to invent. As a result, other scholars have argued that the costs to inventors due to additional disclosure requirements may outweigh resulting
benefits to competitors. 219 An analysis of competitive advantage may
help to resolve this dispute. To the extent that expanding the disclosure
requirements for U.S. patents fosters competition, such a change would
increase domestic rivalry among U.S. firms more than rivalry within
foreign countries. In contrast, the additional costs of increased disclosure would be borne by both U.S. and foreign inventors. 22o
Similarly, considerations of competitive advantage suggest that
greater resources should be spent reducing the number of invalid pat217 See supra notes 170-187 and accompanying text (explaining that U.S. policymakers
have strengthened U.S. patent protection to incentivize innovation and have attempted to
strengthen foreign patent law to limit competitive disparities).
218 See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 128, at 239; Kelly Casey Mullally, Patent Hermeneutics: Form and Substance in Claim Construction, 59 FLA. L. REV. 333, 371-80 (2007); Harry
Surden, Efficient Uncertainty in Patent Interpretation, 68 WASH. & Ln: L. REV. 1737, 1809-17
(2011); see also John R. Thomas, Claim Re-Constmction: The Doctrine of Equivalents in the PostMarkman Era, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 153, 164 (2005) (noting that "many commentators
believe that it is only fair that inventors should claim their inventions precisely").
219 il\Tilliam Hubbard, Efficient Definition and Cornmunication of Patent Rights: The Irnportance of Ex Post Delineation, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. LJ. 327, 359-60
(2009) (discussing tradeoffs inherent in communicating the scope of patent rights).
220 See Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 889-90 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (indicating that foreign investors must abide by U.S. patent law requirements because foreign patents are not
assertable in the United States).
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ents issued by the U.S. Patent Office. U.S. patents may be invalid for
many reasons. For example, a valid patent must describe an invention
that is useful and substantially different from existing technology, and it
also must provide sufficient information for a person of ordinary skill
in the releyan t technological field to utilize the paten ted inyen tion. 221
Though the U.S. Patent Office strives to issue only valid patents, mistakes are common, in part because budgetary constraints force patent
examiners to spend very little time reviewing each patent application. 222 Moreover, proving that patents are valid after they issue can be
difficult because challengers must prove that patents are invalid by
clear and convincing eyidence. 223
Like all patents, invalid patents can reduce competition in the
United States. But unlike the harm to competition caused by valid patents, the harm to competition caused by the possibility of patent invalidity is not commensurately justified by inventive benefits.224 One way
to reduce the number of invalid patents issued by the U.S. Patent Office is to increase the resources that the U.S. Patent Office can devote
to patent examination, for example by raising the filing fees for patent
applicants. 225 Although raising patenting costs for inventors would reduce the net value of patents and thus, to some degree, reduce incentives to invent, an analysis of competitive advantage suggests that, to
some extent, reduced incentives to invent may be justified because re-

221 35 U.S.c. § 101 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (usefulness); id. § 102 (novelty); id. § 103
(non-obviousness); id. § 112 (sufficiency of information).
222 Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law's Presumption of Validity, 60
STAN. L. REv. 45, 61 (2007); Michael J. Meurer, Patent Examination Priorities, 51 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 675, 679 (2009). By one estimate, patent examiners spend on average only
eighteen hours reviewing a typical patent application. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley,
The Growing Complexity of the United States Patent System, 82 B.U. L. REv. 77, 135 (2002).
223 Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd., 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2251 (2011). But see David. L. Schwartz
& Christopher B. Seaman, Standards of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Experiment from Patent
Law, 26 HARV. J,L. & TEcn. 429, 432 (2013) (finding in an empirical study that mock jurors found a patent invalid under a clear and convincing standard at rates statistically indistinguishable from invalidation under a preponderance of the evidence standard).
224 See Katherine E. White, Preserving the Patent Process to Incentivize Innovation in Global
Economy, 13 SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 27, 30-33 (2006) ("Making it easier to invalidate patents will lessen their economic value. It is likely that such a change will have a negative affect [sic] on the incentive to innovate.").
225 James Bessen et aI., Can New Fees Fix the Patent System? Experts Weigh In, WIRED (Sept.
6, 2012, 2:10 PM), http://www.wired.com/opinion/2012/09/ can-new-fees-fix-the-patentsystem/ (suggesting that "[m]ore patent applications mean more low-quality patents" and
observing that "[t]he [U.S. Patent Office] is well-known for its tendency to grant patent
applications rather than go through the cost and hassle of denials and referrals").
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ducing the number of invalid U.S. patents would increase U.S. competitiveness in global markets.
Competitive advantage analysis indicates that if patenting fees increase, those costs perhaps should not rise for all types of inventors. As
described above, U.S. patents do not provide equal incentives to invent
for foreign and U.S. inventors when language barriers, cultural differences, and other transaction costs significan tly raise the costs of foreign
inventors obtaining U.S. patents. 226 Such costs are likely greater for
small businesses in foreign countries than for sophisticated foreign
corporations. 227 Consequently, U.S. patents may provide more significant incentives to invent for small businesses in the United States than
in foreign countries. Raising patenting costs among small businesses
would reduce this advantage because U.S. businesses would shoulder
the bulk of the increased financial burden-and thus invent less. In
contrast, raising fees among large corporations would more equivalently reduce incentives to invent for both foreign and U.S. firms. In
fact, U.S. patent law already requires larger companies to pay higher
fees to obtain U.S. patents,228 a feature that may contribute to U.S.
competitive advantage. 229
Although weakening U.S. patent law by adjusting patent law doctrines related to patent scope and validity may increase U.S. competitive
advantage, implementing such reforms is difficult because empirical
challenges hinder the effective recalibration of U.S. patent law. 230 For
example, if disclosure obligations for patent applicants in the U.S. Paten t Office should increase, empirical challenges make it difficult to determine how much those obligations should increase. Likewise, even if
sophisticated inventors should pay larger fees when applying for patents, it is not clear how much larger those fees should be. Because of

See Hubbard, supra note 8, at 364-65; supra note 106 and accompanying text.
Cf Patenting by Organizations 2011, supra note 113, at Al-l (reporting that in 2011,
28% of individual inventors receiving U.S. patents were fO!'eign, whereas 52% of corpOl'ations receiving U.S. patents were foreign).
228 35 U.S.c. § 41 (h) (1) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (stating that small businesses, independent inventors, and nonprofit organizations shall have fees "reduced by 50 percent").
The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act established even lower fees fO!' particularly small
and unsophisticated patent applicants. Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 10(b), 125 Stat. 284,31617 (2011); see Tony Dutra, BLOOMBERG LAW, PTO Publishes Final Rule on Micro Entity Status
for Reduced Patent Application Fees, DAILY REP. WR EXECS., Dec. 21, 2012, at 1, 1-2.
229 The overall innovative contribution of unsophisticated inventors, however, is unclear. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 128, at 166 (contending that "the role of the small
inventOl' is frequently hyped and distorted"); Hubbard, supra note 98, at 410-11.
230 See FRITZ, supra note 152, at 80; supra note 151 and accompanying text.
226
227
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these empirical obstacles, lawmakers should be careful when adjusting
U.S. patent law to increase U.S. competitiveness.
One way to address these empirical challenges is to focus on reforms that do not significantly reduce incentives to invent. Although
patents are designed to create meaningful incentives to invent, empirical studies have found that, in some industries, patents are less important for encouraging inyention. 231 For example, one recent study found
that software entrepreneurs consider patents to be only "[s]lightly important" to protecting new discoveries. 232 Despite industry differences,
the scope of patent protection is in many respects identical for all types
of technology. 233 In industries where patents provide weaker incentives
to innovate, the competitive cost of U.S. patent law is more likely to exceed the factor-creation benefits. As a result, modestly weakening patent protection in such industries may allow rivalry to flourish without
reducing innovation.
Industry-specific patent reform, however, may not increase U.S.
competitive advantage for several reasons. First, accurately identifYing
technologies for which patents provide less incentive to invent is difficult. Empirical studies that evaluate the incentive effect of patents use
broad industry categorizations that include many different types of
technologies within them. 234 Second, it would be difficult to draft legislation that appropriately defined the relevant industries, as industry
boundaries are " vague and notoriously mutable. "235 Statutory categorization likely would be imprecise too, particularly as technology changes
oyer time. 236 Third, even if lawmakers could accurately identifY technologies where patents provide less incentive to invent, patents may still
be a significant factor. For example, the study that found that patents

231 Graham et al.. supra note 1. at 1283; Levin et aI., supra note 123, at 796-97,818.
232 Graham et aI., supra note 1, at 1290.
233 The U.S. Patent Act contains few technology-specific provisions. See generally 35 U.S.
§§ 101-103, 112 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (establishing basic patent law parameters). Courts
may, howeve1; apply these technology-neutral laws differently to different technologies. See
generally HURK & LEMLEV, supra note 120 (arguing that U.S. patent law should treat different technologies differently and that the judiciary is better suited to this task than Congress) .
234 See, e.g., Graham et aI., supra note 1, at 1290 (describing the incentive effect of patents for "[bliotechnology"); Levin et aI., supra note 123, at 797 (describing the incentive
effect of patents for computers, communications equipment, and motor vehicles).
235 HURK & LEMLEY, supra note 120, at 98.
236 Id. at 98-99 ("The history of industry-specific statutes suggests that many fail because they are drafted with then-current technology in mind and are not sufficiently general to accommodate the inevitable changes in technology."); see also Hubbard, supra note
8, at 377-78 (describing some pitfalls of employing industry-specific measures).
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were "[s] lightly important" to protecting software did not find that patents were "[n]ot important at all. "237
C. Patent Harmonization and Competitive Advantage

Patent harmonization provides another potential avenue for weakening U.S. patent law to increase the competitive advantage of U.S.
firms. As noted earlier, when U.S. patent law provides stronger rights
than foreign patent law, U.S. patents harm domestic rivalry in the
United States more than foreign patents harm rivalry in their home
countries. 238 Consequently, harmonizing U.S. patent law with foreign
patent laws could eliminate some of the asymmetries currently undermining U.S. competitiveness. For instance, the United States recently
changed from a "first-to-invent" patent system, which used invention
dates to determine certain issues of validity and patent ownership, to a
"first-to-file" system, which relies instead on patent application filing
dates. 239 At the time the United States made this change, every other
patent system in the world was a first-to-file system. 240 Some lawmakers
opposed the change, arguing that it would ''weaken our unique U.S.
system by forcing our country to 'harmonize' U.S. patent standards
downward to the level of the weaker systems in Europe and Asia. "241
Even if concerns regarding the weakening effect of this harmonization
were correct, these opponents may have supported the change if they
were aware that it might promote U.S. economic prosperity.
Despite its potential advantages, harmonization can reduce U.S.
competitiveness when the optimal balance between incentives to invent
and domestic rivalry is different for the United States than for other
countries. 242 As described above, stronger patent laws are more likely to
increase the competitive advantage of countries in which factor conditions, like the availability of highly educated workers and the presence
of advanced research universities, lower the cost of discovering new inGraham et aI., supra note 1, at 1290.
See supra notes 159-169 and accompanying text (illustrating this point).
239 Hubbard, supra note 8, at 367.
240 WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONGo RESEARCH SERV., R41638, PATENT
REFORM IN THE 112TH CONGRESS: INNOVATION ISSUES 7 (2011).
241 Dana Rohrabache1~ Toward Better Patent Reform, POLITICO (June 20, 2011), http://
www.politico.com/news/stOl.ies/0611/57394.html; see Kevin Noonan, Senator-Feinstein Opposes
First-to-FilR Provisions of Patent Reform Bill (S. 23), PAT. Docs (Mar. 3, 2011, 11:59 PM),
http://www.patentdocs.Ol.g/ 2011 /03 / senatOl~feinstein-opposes-the-first-to-file-provisions- ofs-23.html.
242 See Reichman, supra note 103, at 1116-17 (arguing that intellectual property law
disparately affects countries with divergent factor conditions).
237
238
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ventions. 243 Countries where firms rarely discover new inventions, like
developing countries, have consequently been reluctant to enact robust
in tellectual property laws. 244 Thus, particularly for aspects of paten t law
for which there is not global uniformity, the United States should exercise caution when weakening patent protection through harmonization. 245
As with other possible changes, empirical challenges make it difficult to determine whether adopting the patent laws from another legal
system would increase U.S. competitiveness. 246 For instance, as noted
earlier, public disclosure of an invention before an inventor files a patent application will invalidate a patent on that invention in many countries, but U.S. patent law provides a one-year grace period. 247 In some
respects, the one-year grace period may bolster U.S. competitiveness.
The grace period potentially accelerates the public disclosure of new
inventions and also increases incentives to invent by strengthening the
validity of U.S. patents. 248 On the other hand, by limiting the circumstances in which patents are invalid, U.S. patent law provides stronger
patent rights than those available in most other countries, and stronger
U.S. patents inhibit competition by and among U.S. firms.249 Moreover,
the grace period's benefits are available to foreign inventors who apply
for U.S. patents. 250 Ultimately, it may be difficult (if not impossible) to
measure accurately whether eliminating the one-year grace period
would increase U.S. competitiveness.

243 See supra notes 103-106 and accompanying text; see also PORTER, supra note 3, at 80
(discussing the impact of "public and private educational institutions" on competitive advantage).
244 See Reichman, supra note 103, at 1116-17 (observing that developing countries may
not benefit significantly from strong intellectual property regimes); Yu, supra note 13, at
988. Indeed, firms in such countries may rely on the availability of patents in other countries, including the United States, to provide sufficient incentives to innovate.
245 Cf Gerla, supra note 15, at 249 (warning against the dangers of a "monomaniacal
devotion to rivalry").
246 See FRITZ, supra note 151, at 80; supra note 151 and accompanying text.
247 See supra notes 203-204 and accompanying text. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1)
(2006 & Supp. V 2011) (creating a one-year grace period fO!' patent disclosures), with
Ouellette, supra note 203, at 591 n.220 (indicating that most other countries do not have a
grace period for patent disclosures).
248 H.R. REp. No. 112-98, at 38,41 (2011).
249 See supra notes 159-169 and accompanying text (illustrating how strong U.S. patent
rights inhibit domestic competition and consequently global competition).
250 See supra notes 159-169 and accompanying text (explaining that foreign holders of
U.S. patents receive the same patent protections that U.S. holders of U.S. patents receive
and also indicating that more foreign inventors obtain U.S. patents than U.S. inventors).
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Because of these empirical challenges, narrow reforms may be better suited to boosting U.S. competitive advantage than broad ones.
Changes could be focused on situations where there is strong evidence
that changes will drastically increase domestic rivalry while only marginally reducing incentives to innoYate. 251 Because domestic rivalry is
often the most important determinant of competitive advantage, such
changes are more likely to increase competitive advantage. 252 The following Subsections analyze reforms to two defenses to patent infringement for which harmonization is likely to increase U.S. competitive advantage.

l. The Experimental Use Defense
Experimentation on patented inventions is vital to competition. 253
Through experimentation, competitors can "invent around" a patent;
that is, they can develop competing technology that avoids infringing a
patent. 254 Without efforts to invent around a patent, the patent owner
may be able to obtain supracompetitiye returns to the detriment of society even though alternative technologies otherwise could be found. 255
Experimentation also enables competitors to improve upon a patented
invention. 256 Indeed, a successful follow-on innovator may be able to
obtain a patent on an improvement to a patented inyention. 257 In addition, experimentation may be required to ensure that, when a patent
expires, a firm is ready to begin competing with the former patent
251 Cf Bakel', supra note 57, at 589 (advocating fO!' targeted rules and enforcement priorities in antitrust law to promote innovation).
252 See supra notes 43-90 and accompanying text (discussing the determinants of competitive advantage).
253 Ted Hagelin, The Experimental Use Exemption to Patent Infringement: Information on Ice,
Competition on Hold, 58 FLA. L. REV. 483,499 (2006) ("[I]f the public and competitO!'s are
unable to use patented inventions for genuine experimentation, then scientific knowledge
is retarded and market competition is limited.").
254 Id. at 533.
255 Cf Graham et a!., supra note 1, at 1311 (reporting that a significant reason companies do not patent inventions is because other inventors may invent around those inventions); Levin et a!., supra note 123, at 802-03 (indicating that a major weakness in patent
pl'Otection is the capacity of competitors to invent al'Ound patents). Competitors, howevel;
may also be able to invent al'Ound a patent without experimenting on the patented invention.
256 Hagelin, supra note 253, at 533; see also Alan L. Durham, The Factral Geometry of Invention, 53 H.C. L. REV. 489, 490 (2012) ("Most inventions are variations on what has come
before and have the potential to generate further variations or refinements.").
257 See generally BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 127, at 1235 (defining an improvement patent as "[a] patent having claims directed to an improvement on a preexisting invention").

1954

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 54:1909

owner. 258 Although patents must provide significant information regarding an invention, these disclosure requirements do "not require an
inventor to meet lofty standards for success in the commercial marketplace."259 Given this dearth of information, considerable experimentation may be required to commercialize a patented invention. 260 For all
these reasons, unless competitors can perform such experimentation
during the term of a patent, meaningful competition regarding the
invention may not commence until well after the patent expires.
Current U.S. patent law does not explicitly allow competitors to
experiment on patented technology. Instead, a U.S. patent simply
grants its owner the exclusive right to "use" an invention, and the basic
provisions of the Patent Act do not provide any significant limits on the
uses covered by that right. 261 Courts initially interpreted "use" narrowly,
holding that experimentation is not a "use" of technology subject to
patent infringement liability.262 As Justice Joseph Story explained in
1813, "it could never have been the intention of the legislature to punish a man, who constructed ... a machine merely for philosophical experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to produce its described effects. "263
More recently, however, the Federal Circuit has all but eliminated
the defense. 264 For example, the Federal Circuit has held that the ex258 Under CUlTent law, patents generally expire twenty years from the date the patent
application was filed with the U.S. Patent Office. 35 U.S.c. § 154(a) (2) (2006 & Supp. V
2011 & Supp. VI 2012).
259 CFMT, Inc. v. Yieldup Int'l Corp., 349 F.3d 1333, 1338-39 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
260 See Karl F. Jorda, Patent and Trade Secret Compumumtariness: An Unsuspected Synergy, 48
WASHIIURN LJ. 1,23 (2008); see also Graham et aI., supra note 1, at 1290 (observing that
entrepreneurs tend to find "first-mover advantage" more important than patents in gaining competitive advantage); Levin et aI., supra note 123, at 794-95 (noting that in many
industries "learning curve advantages" are more important that patent protection).
261 See 35 U.S.c. § 271 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). Other provisions of U.S. patent law appeal' to encourage experimentation but do not explicitly sanction it. For example, U.S.
patent law requires that a patent applicant disclose sufficient information about an invention to enable a person of ordinary skill to practice the invention. 35 U.S.c. § 112 (2006 &
Supp. V 2011); see also Hagelin, supra note 253, at 513-15 (arguing that the enablement
requirement of section 112 demonstrates the need for an experimental use defense).
262 See Poppenhusen v. Falke, 19 F. Cas. 1048, 1049 (C.C.S.D.N.Y 1861) (No. 2262) ("It
has been held, and is no doubt now well settled, that an experiment with a patented article
for the sole purpose of gratifYing a philosophical taste, or curiosity, or for mere amusement, is not an infringement of the rights of the patentee."); Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554,
555 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 12,391); Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600).
263 Cutter; F. Cas. at 1121.
264 See, e.g., Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Embrex, Inc.
v. Servo Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Roche Prods., Inc. V. Bolar
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perimental use defense applies only to experiments "for amusement, to
satisfY idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry. "265 Any experiment "in furtherance of the alleged infringer's legitimate business"
does not qualify for the defense. 266 In fact, the Federal Circuit has even
refused to apply the defense to experiments designed to identifY noninfringing alternatives to a patented invention. 267 For instance, the court
refused to apply the defense to efforts by a pharmaceutical company to
obtain Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval for a generic
version of a patented drug even though the company did not intend to
produce the generic drug until after the patent on the drug expired. 268
On the other hand, one aspect of the experimental use defense
has broadened in recent years. In response to the Federal Circuit's rulings that the experimental use defense does not protect efforts to develop generic drugs, Congress added a new provision to the Patent Act
that extends the experimental use defense to "uses reasonably related
to the development and submission of information under a Federal law
which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs. "269 The Federal
Circuit initially interpreted this provision narrowly, holding that it applied only to "clinical testing to supply information to the FDA" and did
not apply to general biomedical research. 270 Ultimately, though, the
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the provision permits reasonable
experimentation even in early stages in the development of a compound that might one day be submitted for FDA approval. 271 Thus, for
biomedical research, the experimental use defense provides robust
protection. But outside of this technological arena, the defense is all
but meaningless. 272
Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 1860-61 (Fed. Cir. 1984). See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2006 &
Supp. V 2011) (establishing the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals' jurisdiction).
265 Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362-63 (quoting Em.brex, Inc., 216 F.3d at 1349).
266Id.
267 See Em.brex, 216 F.3d at 1346, 1349 (holding that an inventor infringed a patent by
experimenting with a patented method of inoculating birds even though the inventor
intended to design around the patent).
268 Roche Prods., Inc., 733 F.2d at 1860-61.
269 35 U.S.c. § 271 (e) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
270 Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. Y. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 866 (Fed. Cir. 2003), rev'd
Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2003).
271 Merck KGoA, 545 U.S. at 207.
272 Beyond the realm of utility patents (patents granted fO!' a process, a machine, a
manufacture, or a composition of matter), the Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.c.
§§ 2321-2382 (2012), which protects novel varieties of sexually reproduced plants, explicitly contains a broad experimental use defense to claims asserted under its prmisions. 7
U.S.c. § 2544 ("The use and reproduction of a protected variety for plant breeding or
other bona fide research shall not constitute an infringement of the protection provided
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Importantly, expanding the experimental use defense in the United States would not significantly undermine incentives to invent. Instead, a broader experimental use defense would merely ensure that
inventors receive rights no broader than those explicitly established by
law. For example, experimentation that prepares a competitor to use
patented technology after the patent expires does not limit the scope of
exclusive patent rights during the statutory term of the patent. Similarly,
exempting from patent liability experimentation that allows competitors to develop non-infringing alternatives to a patented technology
simply limits patent protection to the invention described in the patent.
So long as Congress, the courts, and the U.S. Patent Office have established adequate incentives to invent through aspects of patent law only
tangentially related to the experimental use defense, strengthening the
experimental use defense will not reduce those incentives. 273 Indeed,
without a meaningful experimental use defense, patent owners may
receive excessively broad patent rights that actually impede future efforts to invent by preventing researchers from building on patented
discoveries. 274 Thus, rather than reducing incentives to invent, a broader experimental use defense can actually encourage invention.
Moreover, unlike U.S. patent law, the patent laws of many foreign
jurisdictions provide broader protection for experimentation. 275 For
example, Japanese patent law states that "[a] patent right shall not be
under this chapter."); see also HLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 127, at 1236 (defining
utility patent).
273 It is unlikely that, in determining the appropriate scope of patent protection in the
United States, Congress, courts, and the U.S. Patent Office relied on the absence of a
meaningful experimental use defense. For example, as noted above, a robust experimental
use defense will sometimes be necessary to ensure that a patent does not prevent competitors from developing non-infringing alternatives to the patented technology. The Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals has recently expressed its belief that patent rights should be limited to the scope of the patented invention, and thus should not restrict the development
of non-infringing technologies. Ariad Pharm., Inc. y. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1353
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (holding that "the scope of the right to exclude ... [should]
not ovelTeach the scope of the inventor's contribution to the field of art as described in
the patent specification" (internal quote marks omitted) (quoting Uniy. of Rochester y.
G.D. Searle & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 2010))).
274 See supra notes 147-149 and accompanying text (explaining that broad patent
rights can inhibit follow-on inyention).
275 CARRIER, supra note 116, at 270; see Hagelin, supra note 253 at 520-22. Notably, Chinese patent law contains an explicit experimental use exception, but the scope of this defense is unclear as it applies to use of patented technology "specially for the purposes of scientific research and experimentation." Patent Law of the People's Republic of China
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, effective Mar. 12,
1984), art. 69, SlATE INTELL. PROP. 0"",. m THE P.R.C. (Jan. 19, 2011), http://english.
sipo.goy.cn/laws/lawsregulations/2011 OIl t2011 0119_566244.html.
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effective against the working of the patented invention for experimental or research purposes. "276 Similarly, Korean patent law explicitly allows for use of a "patented invention for the purpose of research or experimen ts. "277 The patent laws of all but one of the countries in the
European Union expressly contain experimental use defenses. 278 In
fact, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Spain, Sweden, and the UK all have nearly identical provisions
that create an experimental use defense in each country. 279
Because the experimental use defense is weaker in the United
States than in other jurisdictions, U.S. patent law limits domestic competition more than foreign patent law restricts foreign competition,
thereby reducing the competitive advantage of U.S. firms. Moreover,
allowing experimental uses would not significantly undermine incentives to innovate in the United States. Expanding the experimental use
defense thus is an example of a situation in which harmonization with
other patent systems is likely to increase the competitiveness of U.S.
firms in global markets. 28o Indeed, in the absence of a robust experimental use defense in U.S. patent law, some U.S. companies may be
forced to locate research facilities outside of the United States. 281
2. The Prior Use Defense
Broadening the prior use defense is another change to U.S. patent
law that would likely increase the competitive advantage of U.S. firms.
276 Tokkyoho [Patent Act], Act No. 121 of 1959, art. 69-1 (Japan), translated in Patent
Act (Act No. 121 of 1959), CAIIINET SECRETARIAT, http://www.cas.goJp/jp/seisaku/hourei!
data/PA.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2013).
277 T'ukhopop [Patent Law], Act No. 950, Noy. 28, 1949, art. 96, amended by Act No.
9985, Jan. 27, 2010 (S. Kor.) , translated in Republic of Korea, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/ en/textJsp?file_id=214463 (last visited Sept. 23, 2013).
278 P. VAN EECKE ET AL., MONITORING AND ANALYSIS OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIMES AND THEIR USE: RESULTS OF A STUDY CARRIED OUT ON
Ih:HALI< OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION (DC RESEARCH) 149 (2009).
279 Id. The experimental use defense in many EUl'Opean countries also explicitly applies to "studies and trials" undertaken to develop generic versions of patented medicines.
Id. at 144 (quoting Council DirectiYe 2004/27/EC, art. 10,2004 OJ. (L 136) 39 of the
EUl'Opean Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the Community Code Relating to Medicinal Products for Human Use, art. 10,2004 OJ. (L 136) 39).
280 Establishing the appropriate scope of an experimental use defense inyolves additional challenges, including, as usual, empirical difficulties. See Hagelin, supra note 253, at
541-47 (pl'Oposing a broader experimental use defense after eyaluating a variety of appl'Oaches) .
281 Cf Moris & Kannankutty, supra note 41, at 1 (reporting that according to the National Science Foundation, almost a quarter of all research and development workers employed by U.S. companies work outside of the United States).

1958

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 54:1909

Sometimes, the first inventor to seek patent protection is actually the
second person to discover an invention. As a result, issuing a patent to
the second person would enable that inventor to prevent the first-intime inventor from utilizing the invention. A prior use defense addresses this situation by allowing an earlier inventor to continue to use
a discovery, despite the issuance ofa patent to a later inventor. 282
Protecting prior uses from patent infringement generally increases
domestic rivalry by exempting from patent liability any competitors
who began to use a technology before the patentee filed a patent application. 283 Prior uses are often particularly important to competition
because the prior user has no opportunity to avoid investing in infringing technology. By definition, the prior user begins to use technology
before a second inventor obtains a patent on it. 284 Consequently, without this defense the prior user often must choose between licensing or
282 See 35 U.S.c. § 273(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (codifying the prior use defense).
Prior public uses sometimes will invalidate a patent altogether. Secret prior uses, though,
often do not invalidate patents. For instance, in 1998 in Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nurser);
Inc., the Federal Circuit stated:

If the invention was known to or used by others in this country before the
date of the patentee's invention, the later inventor has not contributed to the
store of knowledge, and has no entitlement to a patent. Accordingly, in order
to invalidate a patent based on prior knowledge or use, that knowledge or use
must have been available to the public.
148 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFl'ICE, REPORT
ON THE PRIOR USER RIGHTS DEH:NSE 29 (2012) (stating that "[p]rior user rights tend to
work against the excludability function of patents").
283 For example, in the 2002 U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
case Seal-FlRx, Inc. v. W.R. Dougherty & Associates, a patent owner (Seal-Flex) accused a competitor (Dougherty) of infringing a patented method for constructing athletic surfaces.
Dougherty argued that it should not be liable for infringement because it had been commercially using the patented method more than a year before Seal-Flex submitted its patent application. 179 F. Supp. 2d 735, 736-37 (E.D. Mich. 2002). The court, howevel; found
that Dougherty had waived any claim to prior use., id. at 741-42, and later awarded SealFlex substantial damages. See Seal-Flex, Inc. v. W.R. Dougherty & Assos., 254 F. Supp. 2d
647,660 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (determining remedies for plaintiff). Had the court applied
the prior use defense, Seal-Flex might have faced more intense rivalry. Indeed, Seal-Flex
had already asserted the patent against other competitors in two separate lawsuits. See SealFlex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Constr., 870 F. Supp. 753, 755 (E.D. Mich. 1994); SealFlex, Inc. v. Atlas Tracks, Inc., No. 1:92-CV-194, 1993 WL 763152, at *1-2 (WD. Mich. Feb.
12, 1993), vacated, No. 93-1432, 1994 WL 745348 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 9, 1994). In one of these
cases, the district court held that the patent was invalid, but the court of appeals vacated
that ruling pursuant to settlement agreements and a joint motion to vacate. Atlas Tracks,
Inc., 1994 WL 745348, at *1.
284 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 127, at 1314 (defining prior user right as
"[t]he right of a first inventor to continue using an invention after someone else has patented it").

2013]

The Competitive Advantage ofWeah Patents

1959

incurring significant costs to switch to a non-infringing alternative. In
either case, the prior use defense protects competitors from costs that
reduce rivalry. 285
Despite the competitive benefits of the prior use defense, the defense may reduce rivalry in one narrow sense: it can encourage some
firms to protect their discoveries with trade secrets rather than patents.286 To obtain a patent, an inventor must disclose substantial information about an invention, including sufficient information to enable
a person of ordinary skill to practice the invention without undue experimentation. 287 Competitors may use this information to compete
with a patent owner, particularly once a patent expires. 288 The prior use
defense shelters from liability firms that avoid disclosing their inventions to competitors through patents and opt instead for trade secret
protection. As a result, a prior use defense may undermine incentives
to disclose information that promotes competition. 289
Nevertheless, even if prior use rights undermine disclosure, any
resultant reduction in competition is more than offset by an increase in
competition arising from independent innovation. This is because the
protection afforded by trade secrets is comparatively fleeting. Patents
provide broad rights to exclude; even independent invention is not a
defense to patent infringement. 290 In contrast, the owner of a trade secret has no claim against a competitor that independently invents or
reverse engineers the secret. 291 Indeed, some courts and commentators
285 See supra notes 128-129 and accompanying text (discussing the costs of licensing);
supra notes 133-134 and accompanying text (discussing switching costs).
286 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK O'<'<'CE. supra note 282. at 34. A trade secret is information that "derives independent economic value ... from not being generally known to. and
not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and ... is the subject of efforts that are reasonable
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy." UN"'. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1985).
287 35 U.S.c. § 112(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011); see BrianJ. Love & Christopher P. Seaman, Best Mode Trade Secrets, 15 YAU:J.L. & TECH. 1,3 (2012). Indeed, some firms choose
to forgo patent protection in order to avoid disclosing information that may be helpful to
competitors. Graham et a!., supra note 1, at 1313.
288 Jorda, supra note 260, at 26; see supra notes 264-268 and accompanying text (discussing legal obstacles to experimenting on a patented technology during the term of the
patent).
289 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 282, at 31; see Anton et a!., supra
note 5, at 5. Even when an invention is disclosed through a patent, however, significant
amounts of information necessary to successfully commercialize the invention may be
protected with trade secrecy. Jorda, supra note 260, at 28-31.
290 Christopher A. Co tropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV.
1421,1460-61 (2009).
291 See UN"'. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. Trade secret law protects the owner of a
trade secret from the misappropriation of confidential information. See id. § 1 (2).
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assert that competitors frequently discover inventions protected by
trade secrets "long before the time when a patent would have expired,"
even when trade secrets are not misappropriated. 292 In other words,
"[w] here patent law acts as a barrier, trade secret law functions relatively as a sieye. "293
A strong prior use defense will not significantly reduce incentives
to innovate for two reasons. First, a prior use defense does not impact
the patent owner's ability to hold liable an infringer that begins to use
the patented invention after the inventor submits a patent application.
In such a situation, the defense does not apply.294 Moreoyer, because
the transferability of the prior use defense is severely limited, later infringers cannot avoid liability by purchasing the defense from a prior
user.295 Accordingly, even with a strong prior use defense, patents will
provide substantial incentives for inventors to discover and disclose inYentions.
Second, to the extent that a prior use defense reduces the incentive to innovate derived from patent protection, the defense simultaneously increases the incentives to innovate secured by trade secret law.
Like patents, trade secrets provide important incentives to innoyate. 296
As the Supreme Court has noted, "[c]ertainly the patent policy of encouraging invention is not disturbed by the existence of another form
ofincentiye to inyention."297 Indeed, trade secrets often are more effective incentives for promoting innovation than patents. 298 For example,
292 Jorda, supra note 260, at 6-8 (quoting Dunlop Holdings Ltd. v. Ram Golf Corp., 524
F.2d 33, 37 (7th Cir. 1975)); accord Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 490
(1974). By one estimate, trade secrets have an average life of less than five years. Jorda,
supra note 260, at 7. But see Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 494 (Marshall, j., concurring) ("State
trade secret law ... in its unlimited duration is clearly superior to the [limited] monopoly
afforded by the patent laws . . .. [T] rade secret protection provides in some instances a
substantial disincentive to entrance into the patent system, and thus deprives society of the
benefits of public disclosure of the invention .... "). One empirical study reports that
many firms find their own independent research to be a better source of information regarding competitors' technologies than patent disclosures. Levin et aI., supra note 123, at
806.
293 Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 490. Moreover, trade secrets may be disclosed through licensing agreements. Id. at 486.
294 See generally 35 U.S.c. § 273(a) (2) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (describing conditions
under which the prior user defense applies).
295 Jurisdictions that recognize the prior use defense generally restrict the transferability of the defense. See, e.g., id. § 273(e) (1) (B) (limiting the transferability of the prior use
defense under U.S. patent law).
296 Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 481; seeJorda, supra note 260, at 1.
297 Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 481.
298 See id. at 487-89 (discussing the value of trade secrets when there is "a legitimate
doubt" as to the availability of patent protection for an invention).
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numerous empirical studies have found that, for some types of patentable inventions, firms prefer to protect their discoveries with trade
secrets rather than patents. 299 Protecting an inventor's reliance on
trade secrecy therefore promotes innovation, and prior use rights do
not materially reduce incentives to innovate.
The scope of the prior use defense under U.S. patent law has fluctuated recently, but it likely remains too weak to maximize competitive
advantage. For many years, U.S. patent law lacked an explicit prior use
defense,300 partly because U.S. patent law strongly favored the disclosure of new discoveries. But it also generally protected public prior use
by providing that such uses often completely invalidated later patents. 301 In contrast to public prior uses, U.S. patent law heavily disfavored secret prior uses:

As between a prior inventor who benefits from a process by
selling its product but suppresses, conceals, or otherwise keeps
the process from the public, and a later inventor who promptly
files a [U.S.] patent application from which the public will
gain a disclosure ofthe process, [U.S.] law favors the latter. 302
Even secret prior uses were protected, however, provided that they were
incidental to subsequent disclosure in a patent; if a secret prior user was
the first inventor to discover an invention, but the second person to file
a patent application, U.S. patent law would often grant patent rights to

299 Levin et a!., supra note 123, at 794-95 (finding that finns believe secrecy to be more
effective than patents for process inventions and vice versa for product inventions); see
Graham et a!., supra note 1, at 1290 (finding secrecy to be mOl'e effective than patents in
protecting software inventions, although less effective than patents in protecting medical
device and biotechnology inventions). One important benefit of trade secrecy over patents
is that an inventor need not incur the significant cost of obtaining a patent. See VAN EECKE
ET AL., supra note 278, at 133 (noting that prior use rights allow prior users to avoid the
high cost of obtaining a patent).
300 Before 1952, U.S. patent law did include a prior use defense. U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OI'I'ICE, supra note 282, at 30.
301 For patents issued prior to 2012, a prior use that was public will invalidate a patent,
provided that the prior use took place either (1) before the patent owner's date ofinvention or (2) mOl'e than a year before the patentee applied for the patent. 35 U.S.c.
§ 102(a)-(b) (2006) (amended 2011). Moreover, for patents issued prior to 2012, a prior
use kept secret during the pendency of a patent application can invalidate another inventor's patent. See Flex-Rest, LLC v. Steelcase, Inc., 455 F.3d 1351, 1356, 1358-59 (Fed. Cir.
2006).
302 WL. GOl'e & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983). But
seeJorda, supra note 260, at 1 (stating that "[p]atents and trade secrets are not incompatible but dovetail").
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the secret prior user.303 Prior uses that were protected by trade secrets,
however, received no protection from valid paten ts. 304
Recent legal reforms have expanded prior use rights. In 1999,
Congress created an explicit prior use defense in response to a decision
by the Federal Circuit that broadened the patent eligibility of methods
of conducting businesses. 305 The new prior use defense, however, was
limited to business method patents. Congress further restricted the new
prior use defense to uses that were "reduced to practice at least 1 year
before the effective filing date of [a] patent" and "commercially used"
before the effective filing date of a patent. 306
On September 16, 2011, Congress passed the Leahy-Smith AInerica Invents Act, which drastically reshaped the law regarding prior uses. 307 Perhaps most significantly, the Act changed the U.S. patent system from a "first-to-invent" system to a "first-to-file" system. Under the
new law, when two people independently discover an invention, the
first person to file a patent application will obtain the patent on the invention, even if that person was the second to discover the invention. 308
To ameliorate the impact of the new first-to-file system on initial inventors who are second to file patent applications, the Act expanded the
prior use defense to include all types of paten ted inven tions. 309
The Act, however, limited the prior use defense in two significant
respects. First, the defense does not apply to inventions that, at the time
of the invention, were "owned or subject to an obligation of assignment
to either an institution of higher education ... or a technology transfer
organization for [such an institution] ."310 Second, a prior commercial
use must generally begin at least one year before the patent's effective
filing date. 311 A patentee can extend the required period for public use

303

35 U.S.c. § 102(g) (2006) (amended 2011).
Seeid. § 102(a)-(b), (g).
305 See State St. Bank & Trust, 149 F.3d at 1375-77.
306 35 U.S.c. § 273(a)-(b) (2006) (amended 2011).
307 See Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 5, § 273, 125 Stat. 284, 285-87, 297 (2011) (codified at
35 U.S.c. § 273 (2006 & Supp. V 2011)).
308Id. § 102.
309 See id. § 273 (a).
310 Id. § 273(e) (5)(A). This limitation does not apply if the invention's reduction to
practice "could not have been undertaken using funds provided by the Federal Government." Id. § 273(e) (5) (B). This provision appears to apply, though, even if the institution
of higher learning later transfers the patent to a private enterprise. See id.
311 Id. § 273(a) (2). Under the older first-to-invent system, a secret prior user did not
need to use an invention for more than a year to win a priority dispute. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)
(2006) (amended 2011).
304
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to almost two years by publicly disclosing the invention before filing a
patent application. 312
Importantly, the patent laws of many foreign jurisdictions recognize a prior use defense that is not subject to these two limitations. 313
No other country in the world contains an exception to the prior use
defense for patents developed by an "institution of higher education. "314 Similarly, foreign patent systems do not require that a prior use
be commercialized for lengthy time periods to be eligible for the defense. 315 Indeed, unlike the U.S. requirement for "commercial use" for
at least one year before a patent's filing date, most foreign patent systems require only that, before the filing date, a firm undertake "effective and serious preparations" to begin commercial use. 316 For example, under Korean patent law, the prior use defense applies to anyone
who "[a]t the time of filing of a patent application ... has been working [an] invention commercially or industrially ... or has been making
preparations therefor. "317 Similarly, patent law in the United Kingdom
requires only "effective and serious preparations" for commercial use
before a patent's filing date. 318
Thus, the prior use defense is often narrower under U.S. patent
law than under foreign patent law. 319 Consequen tIy, stronger prior use
defenses help rivalry to flourish in foreign countries, whereas a weaker

35 U.S.c. § 273(a) (2) (B) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
Some of the other limitations in the U.S. prior use defense also appear in foreign
patent laws, however. For example, under U.S. patent law, the prior user defense only applies to use "in the United States." Id. § 273(a)(I). The patent laws of many European
countries contain an analogous geographical requirement. VAN EECKE ET AL., supra note
278, at 99.
314 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OI<I<ICE, supra note 282, at 28 ("In this regard, it appears
that the United States is rather unique in including a provision benefitting the academic
sector.") .
315 Id. at 20-21.
316 VAN EECKE ET AL., supra note 278, at 103; accord U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFl<ICE,
supra note 282, at 15. One form of "effective and serious preparation" explicitly qualifies as
"commercial use" under U.S. law: "Subject matter for which commercial marketing or use
is subject to a premarketing regulator review period during which the safety or efficacy of
the subject matter is established ... shall be deemed to be commercially used." See 35
U.S.c. § 273(c) (1) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
317 T'ukhopop [Patent Law], Act No. 950, Nov. 28, 1949, art. 103, am.ended by Act No.
9985, Jan. 27, 2010 (S. Kor.) , translated in Republic of Korea, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/ en/textJsp?file_id=214463 (last visited Sept. 23, 2013).
318 Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, § 64 (Eng.).
319 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 282, at 21 (,This makes the U.S.
temporal approach significantly more restrictive than that for any other prior user rights
system.").
312
313
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prior use defense limits domestic rivalry in the United States. 320
Strengthening the defense in the United States to align with the patent
laws of other countries, however, would not significantly reduce incentives to invent for U.S. companies. Consequently, to increase the competitive advantage of U.S. firms, the United States should embrace
harmonization regarding the prior use defense. 321
CONCLUSION

The competitive advantage of U.S. firms, particularly in industries
characterized by high worker productivity, is vital to U.S. economic
prosperity. As a result, to maintain or increase standards ofliving in the
United States, lawmakers should work to maximize U.S. competitive
advantage. U.S. patent law affects this goal in at least two respects.
First, U.S. patents provide incentives for U.S. firms to discover new
inventions, and U.S. firms can use innovations to develop products and
services that are better or cheaper than those offered by foreign rivals.
Nevertheless, because U.S. patents also encourage foreign firms to develop new technologies, the incentive effect of U.S. patents often provides little competitive advantage to U.S. firms compared to their international rivals. In fact, because only U.S. patents can be asserted in
the United States and because the U.S. economy is the largest economy
in the world, nonresident patent acquisition in the United States is
more common than in many countries.
Second, U.S. patents undermine U.S. competitive advantage by
restraining competition in the United States, including domestic rivalry. Intense domestic rivalry generally promotes competitive advantage because it drives firms to improve, to reduce intrafirm inefficiencies, and to develop more advanced factors of production. Intense
domestic rivalry also spawns related and supporting industries. By reducing domestic rivalry in the United States, U.S. patents reduce U.S.
competitive advantage. In contrast, due to limits on the extraterritorial
effects of U.S. law, U.S. patents do not significantly undermine the
competitive conditions facing foreign firms.
320 In fact, U.S. finns often cannot eyen compete equally against local finns in foreign
jurisdictions that recognize robust prior use rights because those jurisdictions typically
require prior use in that country. See id. at 21-22; VAN EECKE ET AL., supra note 278, at 99.
321 The extent to which expanding the scope of the prior use defense may affect U.S.
competitiyeness is, however, unclear. In many jurisdictions, few patent defendants rely on
the defense. VAN EECKE ET AL., supra note 278, at 106. As a result, some commentators
haye concluded that "the actual impact of prior user rights is quite small in practice." Id. at

135.
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Thus, it is likely that U.S. patents today often harm U.S. competitive advantage more than they help it. Moreover, due to legal and economic differences between the United States and other countries, foreign patents do not similarly undercut the competitive advantage of
firms in other countries. For example, because foreign patent laws provide less powerful exclusive rights to inventors, foreign patents do not
limit rivalry in those countries as much as U.S. patents limit domestic
rivalry in the United States.
To maximize U.S. competitiveness, the strength of U.S. patent
rights likely should be reduced, and this Article lends further support
to a burgeoning call for weakening patent rights in the United States.
U.S. lawmakers should nevertheless be cautious in doing so because
U.S. patents provide important incentives to invent. One promising
approach to weakening U.S. patent rights is to harmonize U.S. patent
law with weaker foreign patent laws, where doing so would only marginally reduce incentives to innovate. This Article offers two examples
of such an approach: expanding in the United States both the experimental use defense and the prior use defense.

